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Summary
As individuals and enterprises are extensively entrusting their security-sensitive information
and core business to computer systems, it is imperative to formally verify the design and imple-
mentation of secure systems before they are deployed for real-life use. Unfortunately, existing
formal methods are unscalable and oen work with only highly abstract models, and thus they
are far from the expectations of industrial practitioners. As a result, although formal methods
have been proved powerful in some speciĕc areas, we still have not witnessed a wide range of
practical use. is thesis aims to enhance the practical use of formal methods for analyzing se-
cure system design and implementation by extending existing formalisms and combining pro-
gram analysis techniques with formal methods. We focus on three of the most security-critical
scenarios: trusted computing, web authentication and mobile computing.
Modern secure systems are too complex to be built from scratch, and they may import many
oﬀ-the-shelf components which provide particular security features. Focusing on the area of
trusted computing, we propose a formal foundation to facilitate model checking of the trusted
platforms which are based on Trusted Computing Module (TPM). In particular, we study three
problems: the logic and language for formally modeling trusted platforms, modeling of the
trusted computing techniques and attack surface, and the so-called confused responsibility prob-
lem. Further, we show the expressiveness of our formalism in formal modeling and eﬀectiveness
in detecting security Ęaws through applying our formalism and toolkit to two concrete trusted
platforms.
Existing formal analysis approaches usually require a precise and complete formal speciĕ-
cation of the tested system. In reality, however, establishing such a formal model is not always
possible due to reasons like lack of documentation and partial availability of implementation.
A typical example is the web authentication systems which involve proprietary server-side im-
plementation. erefore, we investigate a complementary problem of automatically extracting
speciĕcations from implementations under such a constraint. We propose a novel hybrid infer-
ence approach to combine a blackbox diﬀerential fuzzing analysis with the whitebox program
analysis. We further apply our approaches to study several real-world web sites, including three
popular SSO protocols --- Facebook Connect Protocol, Browser ID and Windows Live Messen-
ger Connect, and demonstrate that extracted fragments of the protocols is of enough precision
for ĕnding interesting logic Ęaws.
Most of previous research, including our aforementioned two studies, analyzes the high-level
formal models, which are seldom equivalent to the implementation that the security eventually
relies on. Soware model checking is a relatively new approach that aims to directly verify im-
vi
plementations. As a meaningful attempt, we apply this approach to verify Android mobile ap-
plications, and we extend the approach with a targeted soware model checking technique, which
integrates static analysis to reduce the search space. In addition, we make eﬀorts to address the
main challenges in verifying Android apps, such asmultiple entry points/event-driven execution,
GUI testing and path explosion. Our approach is applied to test both benign and malicious apps
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1.1 Insecurity of Building Computer Systems
Individuals and enterprises are extensively entrusting their security-sensitive information and
core business to computer systems. Smart phones, online social services, wearable devices, stock
trading systems, e-commerce and online banking are merely a few examples. Security of these
systems, thus, has become a critical concern. Unfortunately, due to the complexity and the fast-
evolving nature of computer systems, building secure systems has been recognized as one of the
most diﬃcult problems in computer science. Long-lasting and catastrophic bugs, Ęaws, errors
and vulnerabilities out of the security-critical systems are continuously reported. A notorious ex-
ample is that the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [168] was found vulnerable to a man-
in-the-middle attack [147] aer it had been published for 17 years. In addition, merely within
the single year of 2014, many severe vulnerabilities have been identiĕed from some soware sys-
tems and protocols which are serving as part of the cornerstone of worldwide computation and
communication. For example, the Heartbleed vulnerability, which exposes 66% of web servers
on the Internet at the risk of credential leakage [20], is identiĕed from the OpenSSL library,
the most popular implementation of the SSL/TLS protocol. As another instance, the recently-
revealed Shellshock bug, which leads to arbitrary-command-execution attack, has resided in the
widely-used Unix Bash shell since as early as 1992 [136].
1
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e rapid growth of openness and interconnectivity of contemporary computer systems has
made the security problem even worse, as the systems are exposed to the increasingly hostile In-
ternet. Not surprisingly, anonymity on the Internet and the high revenue from the underground
economy marketplaces which facilitate the Internet miscreants to monetize the stolen data (e.g.,
credit card information and website accounts) and exploited computers, have given rise to nu-
merous worldwide cybercrimes [98, 72, 106]. As an example, it has been reported by IBM that
in 2013, there were approximately 1.5 million cyber attacks occurring in the US [127]. ese
cybercrimes account for large losses, such as ĕnance cost, business disruption, and reputation
damage. For example, the annual cost of security breaches to the UK is conservatively estimated
in the order of billions of pounds [12].
As a result, before the computer systems are released and used in practice, it is important and
necessary to analyze (and ideally, verify) the satisĕability of their security properties, including
conĕdentiality, authentication, information Ęow property, etc., against particular attack models.
For example, a trusted computing platform designed for high security assurance must achieve its
desired properties (e.g., attestability) even with the presence of sophisticated hardware attacks; a
mobile application must control its granted privileges and credentials against access from other
unauthorized authorities.
1.2 Use of Formal Methods as an Enhancement of System Security
1.2.1 Problems in Building Secure Systems
Security Ęaws can de introduced throughout the lifecycle of system development, typically design
phase and implementation phase.
 Designs of many security systems include Ęaws even though they are designed by security
experts. Besides the aforementioned example of Needham-Schroeder public-key proto-
col [168], other examples can be frequently seen: the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
protocol that is introduced in the 802.11 standard contains Ęaws leading to violations of
conĕdentiality due to themisuse of cryptographic functions [66]; because of several design
2
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Ęaws, SSL version 2.0 was substituted by version 3.0 shortly aer it was released [163]; the
version 1.0 of OAuth protocol, one of the mostly used single sign-on (or SSO) protocols,
contains a Ęaw subject to a session ĕxation attack [17]; the ISO/IEC 9798 Standard, which
speciĕes a family of authentication protocols, was found subject to various attacks [58]
aer it had been extensively analyzed [43, 80].
 Even though the design of a system is correct, Ęaws still can be introduced during the
course of implementation. Besides the low-level programming errors like unchecked array
bound [20, 38, 25], implementation errors can lie in many other details. For example,
as revealed by a recent study [207], the authentication property can be violated in some
implementations of online authentication services based onGoogle ID, such asYahoo! and
zoho, because a step of correctly verifying a digital signature is neglected.
 Another type of errors, which we term as confused responsibility, are caused by the diﬀer-
ent perspectives of the system designers and the programmers regarding the environments
within which the systems are run. At the design phase, the systems are usually designed
at a highly abstract level and without the implementation details considered. erefore
they are designed to be resistant to a set of explicitly-deĕned attacks and under particular
assumptions. However, aer the systems are implemented and used in reality, the behav-
iors of the adversary are unpredictable. In addition, the assumptions made on the design
phase may not be satisĕed in the real-life execution. A typical example is the renegotiation
vulnerability of the SSL/TLS [24], which is attributed to the incorrect assumption that the
client principal does not change in a single round of execution.
erefore, in order to building a secure system, security analysis should be conducted
throughout the whole lifecycle of system development.
1.2.2 Need of Formal Methods
A rich prior research, including whitebox analysis and blackbox analysis, has been conducted in
the literature for the purpose of security analysis. ose approaches based on whitebox analysis
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mostly use conventional techniques in soware engineering, including program analysis [205, 45,
82], reverse engineering [96, 73], taint analysis [95, 44], etc., to extract and vet the behaviors of
a system or track the information Ęow throughout a system. On the other hand, those blackbox
analysis approaches oen use testing and fuzzing techniques [159, 154, 207, 197, 111]. ey infer
the system's internal logics from the observed interaction and communication behaviors of the
system.
ese existing approaches are limited in terms of three aspects. First, they largely rely on the
expert knowledge of the security analysts and their insights into the target system, and therefore
are error-prone and cannot be generalized. Second, they rarely focus on the design of the sys-
tems, whereas the Ęaws introduced in the design stage are highly likely to be transfered to the
implementation. Given that the design-level Ęaws mostly are logic Ęows, they are diﬃcult to de-
tect by analysis on the implementation. ird, although these approaches have been shown to be
eﬀective in identifying security violations out of the systems, they are only able to cover part of
the system behaviors. In other words, they are able to prove insecurity of a system by identifying
violations, but rarely prove the opposite.
erefore, formal methods, which apply mathematical techniques, such as languages, log-
ics and mathematical proofs, to rigorously specify, model, reason and verify computing systems,
have been attracting a wide attention of the security community since the 1990s [64]. A typi-
cal formal veriĕcation method consists of two main phases: speciĕcation and veriĕcation. e
speciĕcation refers to formally specifying and modeling the target systems, and three main types
of formalisms are mostly used: formal logics (e.g., BAN logic [71] and PCL [182]), process cal-
culi (e.g., pi-calculus [35] and CSP [123]) and diagrammatic formalisms (e.g., automata). e
veriĕcation refers to reasoning the desired security properties on the systems, and two cate-
gories of techniques are usually used: theorem proving and model checking. ese formal meth-
ods have been successfully applied to analyze and verify some commonly-used security proto-
cols [34, 32, 61, 49, 189, 190].
Most of the aforementioned formal methods focus on the design-level models, which are
signiĕcantly diﬀerent from the system implementations. Recently, some approaches are proposed
4
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to formally analyze the implementation of secure systems, aiming to verify security properties of
the system implementation, or on the contrast, to identify vulnerabilities. ese studies can be
divided into two categories: speciĕcation extraction [74, 38, 39] and sowaremodel checking [130].
An introduction on these studies is presented in Chapter 2.
1.2.3 Challenges and Limitations in Practical Use of Formal Methods for Security
Ideally, secure system designs and implementations should be formally veriĕed before they are
deployed. In practice, however, formal methods still have not been widely used by industrial
practitioners, even in some of the most security-critical scenarios such as trusted computing, web
authentication andmobile computing. rough our investigation and experiments, we have expe-
rienced challenges as well as limitations of existing formalmethods that hinder their practical use,
and we have also observed that these problems are general problems for most of other scenarios.
Problems in Formal Analysis of System Design. Instead of being built from scratch, complex
systems oen import third-party components, for example, Trusted Computing Module (TPM)
[108, 109] andARMTrustZone [23], to reuse their security features. However, formost of the sce-
narios, there is still a lack of formal foundation including the formal models of those commonly-
used components, such that the security analysts have to formally specify the imported compo-
nents before they can analyze their own systems. In addition, most of the secure systems face a
large attack surface, whereas most of designs are analyzed without a comprehensive set of attack
models. In particular, most formalisms take into consideration only the Dolev-Yao model which
oﬀers a limited behavior model of the adversary [57]. Furthermore, assumptions that are made
by system designers and are necessary to achieve the desired security goals are seldom evaluated
by previous formal analysis approaches.
Problems in Modeling Process. Previous formal analysis techniques usually rely on manually
constructing analyzable models. However, as a system evolves, manually modeling every new
version becomes infeasible. Moreover, the manual modeling process is tedious and error-prone.
On the other hand, in order to obtain a precise and complete system model, most of these tech-
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niques require full implementation of the analyzed system. In practice, however, it is highly un-
likely to obtain the complete information, such as source code of some participants. Extremely,
several custom systems have never been documented.
Problems in Soware Model Checking. Besides the inherent state explosion problem, existing
soware model checking techniques are still inadequate for general-purpose use. First, since
soware model checking needs to dynamically execute the analyzed systems, the incompatibility
problemmaybe raised. Furthermore, the asynchronicity and event-driven execution paradigmof
some systems (a typical example is themobile platform)make the traditional exploration strategy
which assumes a single entry point ineﬀective.
1.3 Overview ofisesis
e main objective of this thesis is to enhance the practical use of formal methods for secure sys-
tem design and implementation by extending existing formalisms and combining program analysis
with formal methods. In particular, we have focused on three security-critical areas which have
raised challenges as discussed in Section 1.2.3, including trusted computing, web authentication
andmobile applications. Our work in this thesis should facilitate the formal analysis of system de-
sign and implementation in these areas, and beneĕt the system designers, developers and security
analysts.
A Formal Foundation for Model Checking Trusted Computing Platforms. Trusted comput-
ing relies on veriĕed trusted computing platforms to achieve high security assurance. In practice,
however, new platforms are oen proposed without a comprehensive formal evaluation against a
broad spectrum of threat models. In addition, the underlying assumptions that are necessary to
achieve the desired security goals are seldom deĕned explicitly. We thus propose a formal foun-
dation formodel checking trusted computing platforms. e foundation includes amodel library
of formal models of security primitives, a model of trusted computing techniques and a broad
spectrum of threat models. It can be used to check the satisĕability of security properties (e.g.,
conĕdentiality and attestability) on the design of trusted computing platforms, and uncover the
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implicit assumptions (on the trusted computing base, use of the trusted computing techniques
and the network infrastructure) which must be satisĕed to guarantee the security properties. In
our experiments, we formally specify and model check two trusted platforms which have been
proposed by previous research.
Automatic Extraction of Web Authentication Protocols from Implementations. Numerous
high-proĕle vulnerabilities have been found in web authentication protocol implementations,
especially in single sign-on (SSO) protocols implementations recently. Much of the prior work on
authentication protocol veriĕcation has focused on theoretical foundations and building scalable
veriĕcation tools for checking manually-craed speciĕcations [211, 56, 62].
We address a complementary problem of automatically extracting speciĕcations from imple-
mentations. e main challenge we address is the aforementioned problem of partially-available
implementation. We propose a novel hybrid inference approach to combine a whitebox program
analysis with a blackbox diﬀerential fuzzing analysis. We aim to automatically recover web au-
thentication protocol speciĕcations from their implementations. In our experiments, we demon-
strate that our approach can recover fairly precise speciĕcations, ĕnd diﬀerences across multiple
implementations and uncover security Ęaws in real-world web authentication protocols.
Veriĕcation of Android Applications against Security Properties Using Targeted Soware
Model Checking. As numerous feature-rich Android applications (apps for short) are used in
security-sensitive scenarios, methods to verify their security properties are highly desirable. In
veriĕcation tasks, the precision oﬀered by existing techniques are oen not enough. For instance,
static analysis oen suﬀers from a high false-positive rate, whereas approaches based on dynamic
fuzzing are limited in code coverage.
As a step towards the precise app veriĕcation, we propose a targeted soware model checking
technique and implement a general framework. Inheriting the intrinsicmerit of traditionalmodel
checking in exhaustiveness of exploring ĕnite state spaces, our technique yet veriĕes the apps
on their implementations (Java bytecode), rather than relying on high-level models. With the
support of our craedmock-up Android OS, our technique is capable of exploring the state space
in a systematic way using driver programs. e driver programs simulate user interaction and
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environmental input, and drive the dynamic execution of the apps. ey are generated along
with state-space minimization using a slicing-based pruning as well as by exploiting dependency
among events. In this work, we focus on checking security properties including sensitive data
leakage involving a non-trivial Ęow- and context-sensitive taint-style analysis. We evaluate our
technique with 70 apps, which include real-world apps, malware samples and benchmarks for
evaluating app analysis techniques like ours. Our technique precisely identiĕes nearly all of the
previously known security issues and four previously unreported vulnerabilities/bugs.
1.4 esis Structure
is section outlines the structure of this thesis.
Chapter 2. Background
is chapter presents a brief overview of formal methods for analysis of secure systems. It
introduces the security properties that are commonly targeted by existing formal analysis. In
addition, it describes the approaches for formal analyzing system design and implementation in
the literature.
Chapter 3. A Formal Foundation for Model Checking Trusted Computing Platforms
is chapter investigates the problem of model checking the designs of trust platforms. is
work highlights the need of a broad spectrum of attack models beyond the traditional Dolev-Yao
model. In addition, this work also studies the previously-neglected problem of confused respon-
sibility and as a consequence, we recommend that the assumptions regarding implementations,
which are made at design stage, should be validated.
Chapter 4. Automatic Extraction of Web Authentication Protocols from Implementations
is chapter presents the work of extracting analyzable models from implementations of web
authentication protocols. e main challenge this work address is the incomplete availability of
implementations. Our approach detect non-trivial security Ęows in real-world web sites, in-
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cluding several using important SSO protocols like Facebook Connect Protocol, BrowserID and
Windows Live Messenger Connect. e signiĕcance of this work is that it demonstrates the ad-
vantage and practicality of formal methods in violation detection even under the constraint of
imprecise and incomplete models, and therefore, we state that it is worth sacriĕcing soundness
and completeness when formal methods are used for violation detection rather than correctness
proving.
Chapter 5. Veriĕcation of Android Applications against Security Properties Using Targeted Soware
Model Checking
is chapter studies the problem of verifying Android applications. e main challenge this
work address is the path explosion problem, and we propose a novel targeted soware model
checking approach to alleviate it. e work highlights the necessity of directly verifying imple-
mentations which the security eventually relies on.
Chapter 6. Conclusion and Future Work
is chapter concludes the work conducted in this thesis, and presents possible future work
from this thesis.
1.5 Acknowledgement of PublishedWork
e following publications and work in submission are from this thesis.
 A Formal Foundation for Model Checking Trusted Computing Platforms [51]. is
work is presented in Chapter 3. It has been published at the 19th International Sympo-
sium on Formal Methods (FM'14). e foundation is also employed by our another work
vTRUST [118], which was published at the 15th International Conference on Formal En-
gineering Methods (ICFEM'13).
 Automatic Extraction of Web Authentication Protocols from Implementations [52].
e work is presented in Chapter 4. It has been published at the 20th Annual Network &
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS'13).
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 Veriĕcation of Android Applications against Security Properties Using Targeted So-
ware Model Checking [54]. It has been submitted for peer review and the work is pre-
sented in Chapter 5.
In addition, we have published three papers which are remotely related to but not presented
in this thesis. e research topics covered by these publications are as follows.
 Conĕning Android Malware via Resource Virtualization [141, 142]. We propose re-
source virtualization as a security mechanism to conĕne resource-abusing Android apps.
e physical resources on a mobile device are virtualized to a diﬀerent virtual view for se-
lected Android apps. Resource virtualization simulates a partial but consistent virtual view
of the Android resources.
 DroidVault: A TrustedData Vault for AndroidDevices [143]. We introduce the concept
of the trusted data vault, a small trusted engine that securelymanages the storage and usage
of sensitive data in an untrusted mobile device. We design and build DroidVault---the ĕrst
realization of a trusted data vault on the Android platform. DroidVault establishes a secure
channel between data owners and data users while allowing data owners to enforce strong




Formal methods have been assisting on designing and implementing secure systems since
decades ago. In view of the eﬀectiveness of formal methods in security analysis, this chapter
presents a brief survey on prior studies, including the target security properties, and formalmeth-
ods on the design and implementation of secure systems.
2.1 Security Properties
Design and implement of secure systems are required to achieve some particular security goals,
which are named as security properties. In prior studies, two security properties, namely secrecy
(or conĕdentiality) and authentication, are most commonly targeted.
Secrecy property is satisĕed if and only if sensitive information and data manipulated by a
computing system cannot be obtained by the adversary. Secrecy analysis is deĕned as querying a
term from the adversary Z's knowledge set. Formal analysis of this property was ĕrstly proposed
by Dolev and Yao [93] in 1983. Since then, the majority of formalisms, such as the Woo-Lam
model [211], the spi-calculus [35] and the applied pi-calculus [33], have supported secrecy spec-
iĕcation and analysis.
Authentication property is achieved if each participant in a system is sure about the identities
of other participants whom it is communicating with. is property was ĕrstly formalized and
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analyzed by Burrows et al. [71] in 1989, who explained how to analyze authentication protocols
with "belief " and identify design Ęaws from authentication protocols. Besides BAN logic [71,
36], many other formal methods, such as applied pi-calculus [33], have supported authentication
speciĕcation.
From the literature, it can be observed that formal analysis of secrecy and authentication
has been well developed. However, these two properties are the most basic ones required by
most computing systems. For a speciĕc system, more complicated and speciĕc properties are
required. For example, for a trusted computing platform, the attestability property is desirable;
for a mobile application, the privilege property is crucial; and for an e-commerce system, the
integrity property of the exchanged messages is important.
2.2 Formal Analysis of System Design
Many prior studies apply formal methods on verifying the satisĕability of the security prop-
erties at the system design stage. Generally, these studies consist of two steps: speciĕcation and
veriĕcation. is section presents a review of these two aspects.
Speciĕcation refers to formally specifying or modeling a system and the following three main
types of formalisms are mostly used.
 Finite state machines. A ĕnite state machine (FSM) is amodel to design the sequential logic
circuits. It consists of a set of ĕnite number of states, transition and triggering events. A
state machine models a system as an abstract machine which is in one of the states at any
particular time. e machine can transits its state when a triggering event occurs. Asyn-
chronous product automata (APA) [169] is one of the FSM formalisms and has been used
to analyze some cryptographic protocols [112, 113]. A related case study of applying this
formalism is the scenario-based formal security analysis of the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) conducted by Gurgens et al.[114]. e main limitation of the FSM formalism is
that it lacks the notion of interaction, whereas a system usually has to interact with other
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systems during its execution.
 Formal logics. A formal logic usually consists of a set of terms, operators and inference
rules. e terms stands for the data, keys and participants in the systems. e operators
model the operations on the terms, such as cryptographic functions. e inference rules
enable to derive the properties of themodel. emostly used logics include BAN logic [71],
PCL [182] and LS2 [89].
 Process calculi. Process calculi aremostly used formodeling systemswith interaction, com-
munication and synchronization. Popular process calculi used in security analysis includes
CSP [123], CCS [160] and pi-calculus [35, 33].
Veriĕcation refers to reason and check the desired security properties on the system speciĕ-
cation. e veriĕcation approaches can be broadly categorized into model checking and theorem
proving.
 Model checking. Given a systemmodel whose state space is deĕned and ĕnite, model check-
ing approaches automatically and exhaustively explore the state space to check whether the
desired properties are satisĕed. If any property is violated, a counterexample containing
the path leading to the state where the violation occurs is generated. e advantage is that
the state space exploration can be systematic and fully automated, while the disadvantage
is that the state spaces of real-world systems can be extremely huge, whichmay lead to state
explosion problem.
A number of model checkers have been proposed for general-purpose analysis. e popu-
lar ones that are used in security analysis include PAT [195, 140, 139], USMMC [146, 145],
AVISPA [19], SPIN [125], FDR [9], Murphi [162], etc.
 eorem proving. Given a formal speciĕcation of the checked system, theorem proving ap-
proaches apply inference rules to derive new rules of interest step by step, until the derived
rules are suﬃcient to prove correctness or incorrectness of the desired properties. e
main advantage of theorem proving is scalability in large system because it is not based
on exhaustive exploration of the state space. Its main disadvantage is the lower automa-
tion thanmodel checking. It requires interaction and expertise of the analysts to generated
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non-trivial rules.
ere are alsomany theoremprovers available for security analysis, including Proverif [62],
CryptoVerif [4], Tamarin [157], Isabelle [14], etc.
Formal analysis on system design is eﬀective in detecting security violations at an early stage.
However, most of these formalisms and tools require a manual modeling process, which is of-
ten error-prone and troublesome. Furthermore, these is still a gap between the veriĕcation of
the system design and the security of the system implementation, meaning that even if a system
design is proved secure, vulnerabilities/bugs may be still introduced during the course of imple-
menting the system. erefore, recent research attempts to apply formal methods directly on the
implementation level, and this is summarized in the next section.
2.3 Formal Analysis of System Implementation
Given the gap between design and implementation, some studies attempt to apply formal meth-
ods to verify the security properties of system implementations. ese studies use two diﬀerent
approaches. One is to extract speciĕcations from the implementations, and then use the tech-
niques discussed in Section 2.2 to verify the extracted speciĕcations. e other approach attempts
to directly check the security properties on the execution of the implementations. is section
surveys these two approaches respectively.
2.3.1 Speciĕcation Extraction
We deĕne speciĕcation extraction by furthering its deĕnition by Avalle et al. [46]. A speciĕca-
tion is an abstract mapping () which maps the implementation S to an abstract model (S).
Verifying a security property  on (S) implies that  is satisĕed on S, namely
(S)  ) S   ,
if  is an over-approximation.
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Many studies have attempted to accomplish this "mapping" (extracting the speciĕcation) by
using techniques such as program analysis, compilation and testing. Lie et al. [144] proposed
a method to automatically extract speciĕcations from the program implementation of proto-
cols. e model is extracted using program slicing and veriĕed by the tool Murphi. In addition,
Aizatulin et al. [38, 39] proposed to use symbolic execution to extract protocol speciĕcations
from their C implementations. is work obtains both symbolic and computational models, and
checks them using Proverif and CryptoVerif, respectively.
Other studies attempt to translate source code into protocol speciĕcation using compiling
techniques. For example, the tools FS2PV [10] and FS2CV translate the programs written in F#
into the protocol models speciĕed in the typed pi-calculus, which are taken as inputs to Proverif
and CryptoVerif. is method has been applied to verify the TLS [61]. Other tools, like Eli-
jah [171], translate Java programs to a process calculus called LySa, and check the model us-
ing LySatool [83]. CSur [5] analyzes the secrecy property of the cryptographic protocols imple-
mented in C. It abstracts the program semantics using Horn clauses and uses the H1 prover to
prove the property. ASPIER [77] compiles the C implementation into a predicate abstraction, us-
ing the iterative abstract reĕnement technique. It then checks the authentication and the secrecy
properties. ASPIER has been used to analyze the OpenSSL implementation.
One limitation of speciĕcation extraction is that some security-related semantics, such as
memory access, object management and pointers, may be missed during the translation because
of the semantics diﬀerence between the implementation languages and highly abstracted model-
ing languages. In addition, these studies require the source code as input, while the source code
is not always available in reality.
2.3.2 Soware Model Checking
Instead of inferring system models and checking them using oﬀ-the-shelf tools, soware model
checking approach attempts to directly check the security properties on the execution of the im-
plementations.
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In the context of sowaremodel checking, a system is associated with a ĕnite state space. e
execution of the system, in turns, can be modeled as a labeled transition system (LTS) Lsys =
(S; init; Block; Tran), where S is the set of states, init is the initial state, Block is the set of
instruction sequences which lead to the change of states, and Tran  S  Block  S is the
set of transition relations. e main diﬀerence between soware model checking and traditional
model checking is that a state is the evaluation of the real variables in the program. Similar to the
traditional model checking, soware model checking exhaustively explores the state space of the
checked system to identify property violations.
Targeting diﬀerent implementation language, diﬀerent soware model checkers have been
proposed. Java Path Finder (JPF) [203] is a Java soware model checker. In this thesis, we use
it to analyze the Android app implementations for security properties. In addition, many other
implementation-level soware model checkers have been proposed. For example, VeriSo [102]
systematically searches concurrent reactive soware systems to detect errors including deadlocks,
divergences, livelocks and assertion violations; CMC [166] andMaceMC [134] check C and C++
implementations.
e soware model checking technique has been used to verify many real-world systems.
Musuvathi and Engler [165] use CMC to check the Linux TCP/IP implementation and detect er-
rors. Yang et al. use the soware model checking technique to successfully detect errors from ĕle
system implementations like ext3, JFS, and ReiserFS [215], and storage system implementations
like Berkeley DB, NFS and RAID [214]. Brat et al. [67] use JPF to identify subtle errors from
NASA's prototype Mars Rover controller.
Similar to traditional model checking, soware model checking also suﬀers from the state-
space explosion problem when applied on large-scale systems. In order to alleviate this problem,
traditional general-purpose reduction techniques such as partial order reduction [101] and sym-
metry reduction [129] can be used. On the other hand, reduction based on static analysis and
domain knowledge of the checked system are also necessary. With this in mind, we propose a
novel targeted soware model checking (detailed in Chapter 5) for Android app checking.
In addition, soware model checking only works on ĕnite-state systems, while real-world
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soware usually has inĕnite number of states. Abstraction, thus, becomes critical for model
checking soware. Predicate abstraction, which was ĕrst proposed by Graf and Sadi [105], is
a promising approach to automatically generate abstractions. Predicate abstraction represents
the large set of concrete states with a signiĕcantly small set of abstract states, each of which corre-
sponds to an abstraction predicate which is over the variables in the program. It enables an more
eﬃcient reasoning than exhaustively exploring the concrete state space. So far, predicate abstrac-
tion has been extensively studied [55, 60, 121, 155], and there are mainly two categories of tech-
niques for program veriĕcation based on predicate abstraction. e ĕrst is the Counterexample-
Guided Abstraction Reĕnement (CEGAR) [85], in which, if the counterexample generated by
model checking the abstraction does not exist in the soware, the generated counterexample is
used to yield new predicate and more precise abstraction. Since constructing the abstraction of
the full soware in CEGAR's each iteration is too expensive, other techniques use an incremen-
tal approach called lazy abstraction [121]. In lazy abstraction, the abstraction and reĕnement are
conducted on-the-Ęy during the course of model checking; the reĕnement only re-abstracts the
relevant parts, instead of the whole program.
17
Chapter 3
A Formal Foundation for Model
Checking Trusted Computing Platforms
3.1 Introduction
e concept of trusted computing has been proposed for more than a decade. It introduces
hardware-support security, which takes tamper-resistant hardware techniques as the root of
trust, such as Trusted Computing Module (TPM) [108, 109], Intel's TXT [13], and ARM Trust-
Zone [23]. ese hardware techniques provide a physically isolated storage and computation
environment, based on which a chain of trust is set up to support the upper layer soware.
Beneĕted from the hardware support, trusted computing achieves an unprecedentedly high
security guarantee (i.e., trust) in systems involving multi-level trust domains. erefore, it has
been widely embraced by mainstream products. For example, more than 500 million PCs have
shipped with TPM [22] so far; Microso equips their recent products Windows RT and Win-
dows 8 Pro tablets with built-in TPM technology [152]. In addition, as we have witnessed, it has
been signiĕcantly inĘuencing the design of contemporary security systems and protocols---many
trusted platforms1 have been proposed both in industry [2, 21] and academia [153, 185, 59, 174,





Ideally, the design of the trusted platforms must be formally veriĕed before they are imple-
mented. However, there still lacks an analytical foundation to guide the formal analysis. New
trusted platforms are oen designed and built without comprehensive analysis against common
threat models, which oen results in vulnerabilities [114, 68, 210, 209, 81, 138].
Formally analyzing trusted platforms is notoriously challenging. First, a trusted platform
usually involves more than one component, including hardware, ĕrmware and soware, all of
which need to be evaluated. In addition, their conĕgurations and communication interfaces also
aﬀect the security properties of the platform. Second, a security analyst has to become an expert
in the internals of the hardware-support techniques and formally model them before she is able
to model her own platform. However, the techniques are subtle and complicated. Taking TPM as
an example, the speciĕcation of TPM version 1.2 [108] from Trusted Computing Group (TCG)
has 800+ pages, and version 2.0 [109] has 1400+ pages. ird, the large attack surface on trusted
platforms requires a comprehensive consideration and understanding of themalicious behaviors.
In this work, we propose TF, a formal foundation for analyzing trusted plat-
forms. TF is designed for the trusted platforms based on TPM, and it could be further
extended to incorporate other platforms, such as mobile platforms equipped with TrustZone.
TF consists of a library of formal models of security primitives, a formal model of the
key techniques in trusted computing2 (e.g., TPM, static root of trust measurement, late launch
and the chain of trust), as well as a broad spectrum of threat models. It provides the platform
designers an interface named TrCSP# (CSP# for trusted computing) for modeling the trusted
platforms. By invoking TrCSP#, the security analysts can import the models provided by T-
F, and this prevents the analysts from stumbling into modeling the complicated internals
of the underlying infrastructure that the analyzed platforms depend on. In addition, the threat
models cover most of the known attack scenarios, including the hardware attacker, the system
attacker and the network attacker. For the security analysis, TF aims to 1) detect Ęaws
from the designs of trusted platforms using model checking, and 2) uncover the implicit under-
2e rest of this thesis refers this model as the TPMmodel.
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lying assumptions on the trusted computing base (TCB), using of trusted computing techniques
and network infrastructure, which must be satisĕed for the platform to guarantee the security
goals.
We implement TF as a framework in C# and CSP# [194] based on the model
checker PAT [195]. We apply TF to formally study two trusted platforms --- an enve-
lope protocol [37] and a cloud computing platform [86]. TF has found that 7 existing
attacks may break their security goals, and identiĕed six implicit assumptions for each of them.
Besides, it has detected two previous-unknown security Ęaws in them, which allow the attacker to
breach the desired security goals completely by simply rebooting the machine at certain timing.
3.2 Motivation & Overview
is section ĕrst introduces the key concepts in trusted computing. It then presents a protocol
based on the trusted computing as our motivating example.
3.2.1 Overview of Key Concepts in Trusted Computing
Trusted Platform Model (TPM). TPM [108, 109] is the root of trust for secure storage and
measurement, which is a tamper-free coprocessor that provides an isolated storage and compu-
tation environment. TPM implements the cryptography primitives such as encryption/decryp-
tion, signature, hash and key management. TPM provides a set of commands for the external
soware to implement functionality that cannot be achieved only using soware, such as build-
ing a chain of trust and remote attestation. TPM contains 24 internal Platform Conĕguration
Registers (PCRs). e only way to modify their content is through the command TPM Extend
(s) : PCRi  hash(PCRi; s). erefore, the value of a PCR can be used to indicate the state
of the soware stack on a platform. A key can be sealed to a particular PCR value, such that the
key cannot be used (unsealed) if the content of the PCR is not in the sealed value. Two impor-
tant asymmetric key pairs are embedded in a TPM, namely the Endorsement Key (EK) and the
Storage Root Key (SRK). ese two keys are kept secret from the external soware.
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Figure 3.1: Sealing Envelope Process in the Envelope Protocol
Chain of Trust. In trusted computing, the chain of trust is a term used to describe the trust
relationship among entities in a system. A chain of trust is set up by validating each of the sys-
tem components from bottom up. ere are two ways to build a chain of trust. e ĕrst one is
the Static Root of TrustMeasurement (SRTM) which builds a static chain since the booting of the
machine; the other is Dynamic Root of TrustMeasurement (DRTM)which dynamically creates a
secure execution environment. In SRTM, the ĕrst soware component is the CRTM (Core Root
of Trust for Measurement), while in DRTM, the component is the Authenticated Code Mod-
ule (ACM).
Remote Attestation. Remote attestation [185] is a process by which a party proves its so-
ware/hardware state to another remote party (i.e., the attester). e goal of remote attestation
is to prove the attester the integrity and trustworthiness of the soware/hardware stack. When
the attestation is requested by the attester, the soware application can ask TPM to sign with the
EK the PCR content yielded in the SRTM/DRTM process and present it to the attester. Since no
entity except the TPM knows the EK, the signed PCR content can prove the state of the soware
stack to the attester.
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3.2.2 Motivating Example
Ables and Ryan [37] proposed a digital envelope protocol. is protocol has been analyzed and
proved correct under certain assumptions by the previous work [91]. Our work attempts to an-
alyze it against a broader range of threat models to uncover the underlying assumptions and if
possible, identify security Ęaws from its design.
Security Goal. e protocol allows Alice to send Bob an enveloped secret, achieving the goal
that Bob can either read the secret or revoke his right to unseal the envelope. More importantly,
if Bob revokes his right, he is able to prove that he has not accessed the data and will not be able
to aerwards.
Protocol Steps. e envelope protocol is designed to work as follows:
1) SealingEnvelope. Shown inFigure 3.1, Alice requests Bob to enter an attestablemode (mean-
ing that the state of Bob's machine is known by Alice) which runs a trusted block. Bob can achieve
this through either SRTM or DRTM. Aer this step, the PCR is in the state S0 (¬&­). Alice
then sends a random nonce n to the trusted block. e value of n is kept secret to Bob (®).
e trusted block extends the PCR with n, so its value becomes hash(S0; n) (¯). Bob cre-
ates an asymmetric key pair k (private key) and k 1 (public key). Bob seals k to the PCR value
hash(hash(S0; n); accept) (°) and generates a certiĕcate to prove this (±). Bob sends k 1 and
the certiĕcate to Alice, and Alice sends back the encrypted secret (²&³).
2) Unsealing Envelope or Revoking Right To unseal the envelope, Bob extends the TPMwith
accept, such that the key can be unsealed for decryption. Alternatively, Bob extends the TPM
with reject (accept and reject are two diﬀerent integers), and requests a TPM quote (a TPM
signed PCR value hash(hash(S0; n); reject))) as the evidence.
Possible Property Violations. is protocol is subject to several attacks, which may lead to the
violation of the security goal. In the following, we show two examples.
1) Nonce Stealing. e conĕdentiality of n is critical in this protocol. If it is obtained by Bob,
Bob can ĕrst choose to extend reject, and then reboot the machine and extend accept to unseal
the key. Here the problem is that it is impossible to set up an encrypted channel directly between
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Figure 3.2: Overview of TF
Alice and Bob's TPM. erefore, there must be particular soware and hardware involved to
bridge them, for example, network adapter, LPC bus (where the TPM chip is located), network
driver and SSL/TLS library. As a result, there are several existing attacks for malicious Bob to
obtain the value of n.
2) Forging Certiĕcate Attack. If Bob compromises a CA (Certiĕcate Authority) trusted by
Alice, an attack can be conducted at Step ². Bob can forge a certiĕcate for a key pair whose
private part is visible to him and deceive Alice into trusting that the key is sealed to the expected
PCR state.
Implicit Assumptions. Given the existence of these two possible violations, two underlying as-
sumptions must be satisĕed to achieve the security goal.
 A1: a Set of Trusted Components. e components that the n Ęows through, such as the
SSL library and the LPC bus, must be included in the TCB.
 A2: aTrusted andUncompromisable CA.AsecureCA is required to validate all certiĕcates.
3.2.3 Challenges and TF Overview
As shown by this example, the design of a trusted platform must be formally analyzed to reduce
possible Ęaws. However, it also shows that formally analyzing trusted platforms is challenging.
 Numerous System Details. Details of the related systems, such as the network and the
LPC bus in this example, must be speciĕed to make the analysis precise and practical.
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 Complexity in Trusted Computing. e semantics of the trusted computing techniques,
such as the TPM, SRTM and DRTM in this example, must be precisely and formally mod-
eled before modeling the protocol.
 Lack of Comprehensive reat Models. In order to achieve a comprehensive and con-
vincing evaluation on a trusted platform, we are concerned about the threat models. e
key challenge is to ĕgure out a broad spectrum of threat models for analytical use.
To overcome these challenges, we propose TF, an analytical formal foundation
and framework for model checking trusted platforms. Figure 3.2 shows the overall design of
TF. TF provides a comprehensive model library and an expressive inter-
face named TrCSP# for modeling trusted platforms (Section 3.3). Its model library contains a
TPM model such that the security analyst can include the models of trusted computing tech-
niques by simply invoking into the TPM model (Section 3.3.3). e platform model is checked
by model checker against a set of attacker models (Section 3.4) provided by the model library. If
an attack violates the speciĕed security properties, the model checker generates a counterexam-
ple. TF then infers security Ęaws and implicit assumptions based on the counterex-
ample (Section 3.4.4).
Scope & Assumptions. e core objective of TF is to identify whether the design of
a trusted platform guarantees the expected properties under a spectrum of attacks. We focus on
revealing the Ęaws and implicit assumptions in the platform designs. We do not target the de-
tection of attacks exploiting implementation vulnerabilities such as the BIOS attack [193], DMA
attack [184] and TPM reset attack [15], but we do take them into consideration when identifying
the implicit assumptions. We do not consider the DoS attack and side channel attacks such as
the timing attack [192]. We also make the following assumptions in TF:
 Perfectly Secure Cryptography. e cryptographic algorithms used by the platforms are
perfectly secure.
 Distinct Secret Keys and Nonces. e secret keys and nonces are secret and distinct
among diﬀerent sessions.
 TPM in Compliance with Speciĕcations. e TPM used by the trusted platforms is
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implemented strictly in compliance with the TCG's speciĕcations. TF does not
consider the deviation between the implementation and the speciĕcation of the TPM3.
3.3 Modeling Trusted Platforms
is section presents the model library and its interface TrCSP#. e model library consists of
models of the security primitives, and these models essentially are the implementation of the
existing LS2 logic [89]. In addition, TrCSP# provides a set predeĕned keywords to model the
trusted platforms.
3.3.1 Overview of the Model Library Interface
We chose to develop TF based on CSP# because this not only allows us to inherit the
expressiveness of extensibility of CSP#, but also enables us to use the well-evolved model checker
PAT for automatic reasoning. In this section, we explain the syntax and semantics of CSP# in-
tuitively to ease understanding the rest of this thesis. en, we introduce how TF is
implemented in CSP#.
Overview of CSP#
e terms deĕned in CSP# and used in this thesis is underlined. We refer the reader to [194] for
the full syntax and semantics of CSP#.
Syntax. e crucial syntax of CSP# is as following.
3is deviation does exist as shown in [184]. Modularity design of TF allows to substitute the model of
a particular TPM implementation for TF's default one.
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Process P ::= Stop j Skip termination
j [b]P state guard
j e! P event preĕxing
j efprogramg ! P data operation preĕxing
j c?d! P (d) j c!d! P channel input/output
j P ; Q sequence
j P Q j P uQ j if b then P else Q choices
j P jjjQ j P jjQ concurrency
j P 4 (e! Q); interrupt
e core of CSP# is the concurrency and communication. A CSP# model is a 3-tuple
(V S; init; P ), where V S is a set of variables, init is the initial values of these variables, and P is
a process. e e is a simple event; program executes an atomic and sequential program when e
is executed; c is a synchronized communication channel. CSP# supports internal choice (PQ),
external choice (P u Q) and conditional branch (if b then P else Q). Process P ;Q behaves
as P and aer P terminates, behaves asQ. Process P jjjQ behaves P andQ simultaneously and
only synchronize through the channels, whileP jjQ requires synchronization over a set of events.
Process P 4 (e! Q) behaves as P until e occurs and then behaves asQ.
Semantics. e semantic model of a CSP# model is a Labeled Transition System (LTS), which is
a tuple (S; init; Act; T ran) where S is a ĕnite set of states; init is the initial state and init 2 S;
Act is a set of actions; Tran is a set labeled transition relations, each of whose elements is a
relation S Act S. We use s e ! s0 to denote (s; e; s0) 2 Tran.
Reachability Checking. Since most of the security properties can be speciĕed in reachability,
we only use reachability checking in this work (Section 3.4.3), although other properties such as
reĕnement and linear temporal logic can be checked on an LTS. We deĕne a path as a sequence
of alternating states and events < s0; e0; s1; e1; ::: >. A state sn is reachable if there exists a path
P such that s0 = init and si ei ! si+1 for all i < n.
TrCSP#: Interface of TF
Figure 3.3 presents the new keywords that are introduced by TF, which are twofold.
eĕrst is the interface formodeling the secure systems, including cryptographic operations, ma-
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Process TP ::= afprogramg ! TP data operation preĕxing
j P process in CSP#
data/variable d ::= n number
j c program
j k symmetric key
j sk j sk 1 private/public key
j d; d0 concatenation
j [d]k j [d]sk 1 ciphertext of symmetric/asymmetric encryption
j [d]sk signature
j h(d) hash
j TPM DATA TPM data
action a ::= new d generate new data object
j read l:d j write l:d read/write d from/to location l
j asymencrypt d:sk 1 j encrypt d:k asymmetric/symmetric encryption over d
j asymdecrypt d:sk j decrypt d:k asymmetric/symmetric decryption over d
j sign d:sk j verify d:sk 1 sign d with sk & verify signature d
j hash d hash over d
j TPM CMD TPM commands
location l ::= ROM@i jRAM@i j disk@i
Figure 3.3: Interface Used for Modeling Trusted Platforms
chines, network, programs, etc. (Section 3.3.2). e other is on modeling the trusted computing
techniques, which are modeled as a set of special data structures in CSP# and used as global vari-
ables (Section 3.3.3). anks to the expressiveness of CSP#, TF can be implemented
using CSP#. In particular, a process of in TF is a CSP# process; the data/variables and
locations are modeled as data structures in the program of CSP#; the actions are modeled by the
events in CSP#, with the semantics (e.g., how to perform encryption) implemented in the pro-
gram. By importing TF and invoking TrCSP#, the analyst is capable of capturing the
necessary details of the trusted platforms.
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3.3.2 Modeling Security Systems
Machines, Bus and Network. Figure 3.4 shows the abstraction of a machine in TF. A
machine is modeled as a process in CSP#. Each machine contains a CPU, a hard disk, a TPM,
a network adapter, ROM and RAM. By default, the ĕrmware such as BIOS and the CRTM are
located in the ROM.e hardware drivers and the soware, such as the bootloader, OS, network
driver and applications, are located in the hard disk. All of them are loaded into the RAM before
they can be executed. Figure 3.5(a) demonstrates a simpliĕed model of loading the OS from the
disk to the RAM. In this model, the keywords enum and var stand for enumeration and variable
respectively, same as that in other programing languages. By default, the enumeration starts from
the integer 0, so both os andCodeos are evaluated 0. e disk and the RAM are modeled by two
arrays DISK and RAM. e execution of the system starts with the process System() (line
a.8), which ĕrst loads the code of the OS from the disk into the RAM (line a.5), and then starts
executing the OS (line a.6 and a.7).
We emphasize the communication channel between the CPU and the TPM, namely the LPC
bus, because it is more vulnerable than other channels like the north bridge that is between the
CPU and the RAM. e LPC bus, actually, has been found vulnerable to an eavesdropping at-
tack [135] and the TPM reset attack [15].
TF models the communication channels among the components and among the
machines with channels. e sender uses ch!d to send out data and the receiver listens on the
channel using ch?d. In the real world, a communication channel can be a private/secure chan-
nel or a public/non-secure channel. erefore, TF introduces the concept of private
channel and public channel accordingly. e private channel is immune to the attacker's eaves-
dropping, for example, the SSL channel, while public channel leaks all transmitted messages to
the network attacker.
Data. Two categories of data are supported in TF. e ĕrst one is primitive data,
including the integer, boolean, cipertext, hash value, signature, encryption/decryption keys,
program and concatenated data. Each primitive data is represented symbolically as a 2-tuple
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Figure 3.4: Abstraction of a Machine
d = (type; expression), where type indicates the type of the data, such as nonce, program and
public key; the expressionmay be a number, the identity of a key or a ciphertext [d]k. e other
type is the TPM data, which is discussed in Section 3.3.3.
Cryptography Primitives. TF includes the standard cryptography primitives, such as
encryption/decryption, signing/signature veriĕcation, hashing, nonce (random number) gener-
ation. ese primitives take the symbolized data as operands. For example, signing a nonce
n = (nonce; 1) with key sk = (private key; 001) (001 is the identity of sk) generates
the signature sig = (signature; [n]sk), which can be veriĕed using sk's inverse key sk 1 =
(public key; 001 1).
3.3.3 Modeling the TPM
Since all the key concepts, such as the root of trust, chain of trust, SRTM and DRTM, are based
on the TPM, we detail the modeling of the TPM in this section.
Abstraction & Simpliĕcation. To reduce complexity in modeling and verifying process, a rea-
sonable abstraction and simpliĕcation is necessary. e challenge is that the semantics relevant
to the security properties cannot be excluded. TF preserves this semantics in the fol-
lowing three aspects.
 Functionality. e functionality of the TPM commands is preserved in a simulation way.
For example, the return value of the command TPM CreateWrapKey is a representation
of TPM key blob, which contains a symbolic representation of encryption key (discussed
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a.1 enum fosg;
a.2 enum fCodeosg;
a.3 var DISK = [Codeos];
a.4 var RAM = [0];
a.5 Config() = loadfRAM@os = DISK@osg ! OS;
a.6 OS() = OSbenign;
a.7 OSbenign() = /* model of the OS */;
a.8 System() = Config;
(a) Loading OS from the Disk
b.1 enum fos; osmg;
b.2 enum fCodeos; Codeosmg;
b.3 var DISK = [Codeos; Codeosm ];
b.4 var RAM = [0; 0];
b.5 Config() = loadfRAM@os = DISK@osg ! SystemAttacker;
b.6 SystemAttacker() = crackMemoryfRAM@os = DISK@osmg ! OS;
b.7 OS() = [RAM@os == Codeos]OSbenign u [RAM@os == Codeosm ]OSmalicious;
b.8 OSbenign() = /* model of the benign OS */;
b.9 OSmalicious() = /* model of the malicious OS */;
b.10 System() = Config;
(b) Compromising OS aer it is loaded (codeosm : the code of compromised OS)
Figure 3.5: Models of Loading OS and an Attack Compromising the OS
soon).
 Internal Semantics. e internal security semantics speciĕed by TCG is preserved.
For example, in the commands that use a sealed key, such as TPM Seal, TPM Unseal,
TPM Unbind, the content of the PCR is checked with the sealed value before the key can
be used.
 Internal State Transition. e internal state of the TPM changes accordingly when the
commands are invoked. For example, when the TPM Extend (index; value) is called, the
PCR[index] is extended with value; rebooting the machine and activating late launch set
the PCRs to a pre-deĕned value.
We make the following simpliĕcations on the authorization and the key hierarchy.
1) No Authorization Required. In a real TPM, the authorization protocols such as the OIAP
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(Object-Independent Authorization Protocol) and the OSAP (Object-Speciĕc Authorization
Protocol) are used to set up a session between the user and the TPM. Since authorization has
been well analyzed in previous work [90], we omit it.
2)NoKeyHierarchy. Based on our assumption that the cryptographic algorithms are perfectly
secure, we do not consider the key hierarchy in TPM.erefore, all the certiĕcates issued by the
TPM are signed using its EK, meaning we do not consider the AIK (Attestation Identity Key);
similarly, all the encryption operations for secure storage use the SRK.
Abstraction of TPM Data. TF models the data relevant to the TPM, including the
internal data structures (e.g., the PCR value, EK and SRK) and the data generated and consumed
by TPM (e.g., TPM certiĕcate, TPM quote, key blob and data blob). Each TPM instance has a
unique EK that can be used as its identity.
A TPM data is constructed from the primitive data. A PCR value includes the index of the
PCR and a hash value to indicate its value. e EK and SRK are asymmetric key pairs. A TPM
certiĕcate is a certiĕcate issued by a TPM to certify that a key is generated by the TPM and has
been sealed on a speciĕc PCR value. A TPM quote is a PCR value signed by the TPM. A key
blob, which is generated by the TPM CreateWrapKey command, includes the public part and
encrypted private part of the generated key. It also indicates the PCR value that the key is sealed
to. A data blob is returned by the TPM Seal command. e models of these TPM data can be
found in our implementation [51]. Here, we just take the TPM certiĕcate as an example to show
how the TPM data is modeled.
Example. A TPM certiĕcate is a 2-tuple (type; expression), where the type indicates that
the tuple is a TPM certiĕcate; the expression is a concatenation of a serial of other data: <
bool; sk 1; int; TPM PCRV alue; ek 1; [bool; sk 1; int; TPM PCRV alue; ek 1]ek >.
e ĕrst element indicates it is a key generated by the TPM; the second is the public part of
the certiĕed key; the third and the fourth indicate the PCR and PCR value the key is sealed to;
the ĕh is the public part of the EK and the last is a signature by EK.
FormalizationofTPM.eTPM is formalized as anLTSLT PM = (ST ; initT ; CmdT ; T ranT ),
where
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sinit/si sin/si sout/si+1
Ch?index.d TPM_Extend Ch!0 sinit/si+1
si = {PCR, VM, {ek, srk}}, si+1= {PCRͰ{index     hash(PCR[index]|d)}, VM, {ek, srk}}
(a) TPM Extend ( is function overriding and seq  fi 7! vgmeans overrides seq[i] with v.)
sinit/si sin/si sout/si+1
Ch?keyblob TPM_LoadKey2 Ch!loc sinit/si+1
si = {PCR, VM, {ek, srk}}, si+1= {PCR, VMĤ{(loc, (sk, sk -1))}, {ek, srk}}
(b) TPM LoadKey2
Figure 3.6: e State Transition Models of Two TPM Commands
 ST = STctrl  STdata is a ĕnite set of states, including control states and data states. e
STctrl = fsinit; sin; soutgmodels the states regarding the input and output; each of STdata is
a set of variables V T and their values (detailed later in this Section). An element of STdata is
a set fPCR; VM; fek; srkgg, where the PCR is a sequence which includes the values of
24 PCRs; the VM represents the volatile memory and contains indexed key pairs loaded
viaTPM LoadKey2, each of which is denoted by (location; fsk; sk 1g); ek and srk stand
for the EK and the SRK, respectively.
 initT 2 ST is the initial state.
 CmdT is the set of the commands.
 TranT is the transition relations, each of which is a relation ST  CmdT  ST . TranT
deĕnes the semantics of the TPM commands, that is, the state transitions upon invoking
the TPM commands.
TPM Commands. We use the state transition models of TPM Extend (Figure 3.6(a)) and
TPM LoadKey2 (Figure 3.6(b)) to demonstrate how we model the TPM commands. e in-
terface TF provides to the security analyst are the commands same as those speciĕed
by TCG.ese commands take as input the symbolized TPM data. us, from the perspective of
the analyst, our TPMmodel can be regarded as a soware-based symbolic and abstract emulator
of TPM.
Correctness of TPM Model. One critical issue is that TF requires a complete and
sound TPM model to prevent false positives and negatives. However, verifying the equivalence
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of our TPMmodel and TCG's speciĕcation is a much more challenging task, and therefore is not
discussed within the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, we show that this model can be eﬀective
in detecting design Ęaws.
As futurework, a reference implementation can be one step towards a speciĕcation-equivalent
model. For example, Mukhamedov et.al [164] develop a reference implementation part of the
TPM (including authorization and encrypted transport session protocols) in F#. e F# model
can be automatically translated into Proverif model and veriĕed by Proverif. Aerwards, the F#
implementation can be automatically translated into C code.
3.4 reat Attacks and Security Goals
Aer coming up with the formal speciĕcation of a trusted platform, the next step is to evaluate
the expected security properties against threats models. is section deĕnes the modeling of the
attacks and security properties in TF.
3.4.1 Attacker's Knowledge and Knowledge Deduction
We deĕne a property called knowledge set AK 2 V S for the attacker. e elements of AK are
the data that can be obtained by the attacker. e attacker can enlargeAK by eavesdropping on
the communication channels, generating data using a machine equipped with TPM (discussed
in Section 3.4.2) and deducing new knowledge based on the data known to him. We deĕne some
rules for the attacker to deduce new knowledge. As an example, Figure 3.7 demonstrates part of
the deduction rules for cryptography.
Two events activate the knowledge deduction. First, when a ciphertext is added intoAK, the
attacker actively tries to decrypt it using all the keys he possesses. Second, when a data of a par-
ticular type is required, for example, outputting a data to a process, the attacker constructs a new
data of the required type. e challenge in knowledge deduction is that applying cryptographic
functions unboundedly may leads to an inĕnite AK. erefore, we bound the nesting depth of
the encryption functions to be less than 3 by default, unless the attacker obtains or a receiver
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rule 1:1 : d 2 AK ^ k 2 AK  [d]k 2 AK Symmetric Encryption Rule
rule 1:2 : [d]k 2 AK ^ k 2 AK  d 2 AK Symmetric Decryption Rule
rule 2:1 : d 2 AK ^ sk 1 2 AK  [d]sk 1 2 AK Asymmetric Encryption Rule
rule 2:2 : [d]sk 1 2 AK ^ sk 2 AK  d 2 AK Asymmetric Decryption Rule
rule 2:3 : d 2 AK ^ sk 2 AK  [d]sk 2 AK Signature Rule
rule 2:4 : [d]sk 2 AK ^ sk 1 2 AK  d 2 AK Signature Veriĕcation Rule
rule 3:1 : d 2 AK  hash(d) 2 AK Hash Rule
Figure 3.7: Deduction Rules for Cryptography
expects data of deeper nest. In the case that data of deeper nest are required, TF in-
creases the bound such that the attacker can construct data with the same nest level. is strategy
is similar to the backwards reasoning used by other state-of-the-art veriĕers like Tamarin [157].
3.4.2 reat Models
We divide the threat models in trusted computing into three categories, namely the network at-
tacker, the system attacker and the hardware attacker.
Network Attacker. e network attacker is modeled using the Dolev-Yao model [93]. An active
network attacker is able to eavesdrop all messages and modify unencrypted messages on net-
work. We assume the SSL channel cannot be compromised; however, if the platform use SSL
as the communication channel, TF reports that the platform relies on two implicit
assumptions---the SSL library must be trusted and a trusted CA is required (uncovering the im-
plicit assumptions is discussed in Section 3.4.4).
A novel feature of the network attacker is that the attacker possesses a machine (denoted by
MA) equipped with TPM. During the knowledge deduction, the attacker can feed TPM with
forged data to generate TPM data expected by the victims. erefore, the attacker can commit
the masquerading attack [193], which forges PCR quote withMA to convince the attester that
the machine is in the expected state, while conducts malicious behaviors on another machine.
System Attacker. e system attacker can compromise all of the legacy soware, including the
bootloader, theOS and the applications. e attacker can read/write all the locations on hard disk
and RAM. Figure 3.5(b) demonstrates the model of an attack which compromises the OS aer it
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has been loaded to the RAM. Aer the benignOS is loaded into the RAM from the disk (line b.5),
the system attacker cracks thememory and replaces the benignOS (line b.6) with amalicious one,
such that the malicious OS will take control once the loaded OS is executed (line b.7).
In addition, the system attacker can invoke the TPM's commands with arbitrary parameters.
One possible attack is that the attacker invokes TPM Extend with the benign code to convince
the attester, but executes a malicious version of the code.
Hardware Attacker. e attacker on hardware level completely controls a machine. e attacker
can compromise the add-on hardware and ĕrmware, for example, DMA attack [120], compro-
mising bootloader and BIOS [133], TPM reset attack [15] and eavesdropping on LPC bus [135].
Compromising ĕrmware such as BIOS and bootloader can defeat the SRTM.eDMAattack can
modify the program aer it has been loaded into the memory, leading to the same consequence
as the system attacker. e TPM reset attack can reset the PCRs to the default state without re-
boot or late launch. e attacker, therefore, becomes capable of setting the PCR to an arbitrary
state as what the system attacker can do. e hardware attacker who can access the LPC bus is
able to eavesdrop the communication between the TPM and the CPU.
Note that TF also regards rebooting a machine as an attack, given it changes the
state of the system and TPM. We name this attack reboot attack.
3.4.3 Security Goals
e trusted platforms are designed to satisfy various security goals. is section discusses two
most commonly used ones. We also show that these two goals and other properties can be spec-
iĕed as reachability properties.
Conĕdentiality. Most of the time, a trusted platform needs to introduce some credentials,
whose conĕdentiality needs to be guaranteed, such as the n in our motivating example. To check
conĕdentiality property, TF queries a credential d from theAK aer the execution of
the platforms. If d 2 AK, the conĕdentiality is violated.
Attestability. Attestability means if the attester believes the attested machine is in a state
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ST , then the machine must be in that state. Violation of attestability may completely violate the
design properties of a platform. As shown in Section 3.2.2, the forging certiĕcate attack manages
to break the protocol. e security analyst can deĕne this property with reachability, that is, it
cannot be reached that the state of the attested machine (in terms of the PCR value) is not equal
to the expected state ST .
Other security properties can also be speciĕed with reachability in TF. For exam-
ple, the security goal of our motivating example, can be speciĕed as
#define bothCan(isBobGetSec == true && isBobRvk == true);
#assert Protocol reaches bothCan;
where the isBobGetSec and isBobRvk are two variables in the CSP# model; isBobGetSec
is set to true whenever Bob reads the secret and isBobRvk is set to true once Alice receives the
TPM quote of hash(hash(S0; n); reject).
3.4.4 Uncovering Implicit Assumptions
Identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial for enhancing the security on the design
level, e.g., by decreasing the size of the TCB asmuch as possible, and guiding the implementation,
e.g., correctly using TPM. We propose a counterexample-guided inference algorithm to ĕgure
out those assumptions. TF applies each of the attacks and the combinations on the
components in the checked model. It uses the model checker to detect the security property
violation and generates counterexamples. In addition, it examines the channels and data used in
the model. Taking them as input to Algorithm 1, TF ĕgures out the assumptions on
the following three aspects.
 TCB. TF considers the components of hardware, ĕrmware and soware. If an
attack targeting a component violates the security goals, the component is added to the
assumptions of TCB (Line 3-6).
 Network Infrastructure. If TF ĕnds the platform uses a private channel, it as-
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Algorithm 1 Counterexample-guided Assumption Inference Algorithm
Input: CE: counter examples,D: used data set, CH : used channel set
Output: ASPT : assumptions
1: for all e in CE do
2: a ResolveAttacker(e);





8: for all d inD do
9: if d:type = certificate then
10: ASPT:add(CA) ;
11: end if
12: if d:type = TPM quote then
13: ASPT:add(usedPCR 6= 16 or 23) ;
14: end if
15: end for
16: for all ch in CH do





22: return ASPT ;
sumes the SSL is used, and thus the SSL library should be included in the TCB and a trusted
CA is needed (Line 16-21). In addition, if the platform uses any certiĕcate, a trusted CA is
required (Line 9-11).
 Use of TPM. TF considers the use of the PCRs. One important but likely to be
overlooked fact is that two PCRs (16 and 23) are resettable without a system reboot (using
theTPM PCR Reset command), meaning that the system attacker can generate any value
for those PCRs and do the same attack as the TPM reset attack. erefore, they cannot be
used for attestation (Line 12-14).
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3.5 Implementation and Case Studies
We have implemented TF in the PAT model checker [195], which is a self-contained
model checking framework for modeling and veriĕcation. We implement TF by inte-
grating into the existing CSP# model an external library. is library implements the model of
security primitives, TPMmodels and the threatmodels in approximately 4k lines of C# code [51].
As case studies, we apply TF on two existing trusted platforms.
3.5.1 Analysis of the Digital Envelope Protocol
We use TF to comprehensively analyze the envelope protocol presented in Sec-
tion 3.2.2. e protocol is modeled in less than 500 lines of CSP# code. is section summarizes
our ĕndings; the reader may refer to [51] for the complete models. Since violating either of con-
ĕdentiality and attestability leads to the violation of bothCan (deĕned in Section 3.4.3), we just
check the assertion of bothCan in our experiments.
reat Models. We deĕne the following attack scenarios based on the threat models.
Network Attacker. WedeĕneNA1 as a network attack which can record and replay the trans-
mittedmessages, andNA2 as a compromisedCAwho issues certiĕcate for a key pair (mk;mk 1)
whose private key is known by Bob.
System Attacker. We deĕne SA1 as a compromised BIOS who extends a benign OS but exe-
cutes another malicious one, and SA2 as a buggy soware component (e.g., the SSL library) who
can be compromised and cause the leakage of n. SA1 indicates the modules measured in S0 but
can be compromised at runtime, while SA2 indicates those that are not measured in S0 but in
fact, are sensitive.
Hardware Attacker. We deĕneHA1a as the TPM reset attack,HA1b as the TPM LPC attack,
HA2 as the DMA attack targeting loaded OS, andHA3 as the reboot attack.
Note that for all attackers, we model the protocol in a way that Bob can re-execute the protocol
and during re-execution, a fake Alice can feed Bob with data included in the attacker's knowledge
set.
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Table 3.1: Statistics in Experiment of Envelope Protocol
Attacks Statistics#States #Transitions Time(s) Memory
NA1 3225 8336 2.18 29M
NA2 7023 13528 7.69 220M
SA1 47451 124680 24.35 198M
SA2 16744 43785 7.94 72M
HA1a 4993 11353 1.94 38M
HA1b 2662 6907 1.63 23M
HA2 47451 124680 21.14 186M
HA3 75110 210663 36.66 232M
Experiments. TF reports that NA1 can obtain n at Step¬. Bob therefore can ĕrst ex-
tend reject and convince Alice with hash(hash(S0; n); reject), and then re-executes the pro-
tocol with the fake Alice and extends accept to get secret. Aer we change the channel to be
private, the data leakage is removed and TF ĕgures out two assumptions: A1 that SSL
library should be included in TCB and A2 that a trust CA is required. For NA2, TF
reports an attack on Step ². Bob forges a certiĕcate to convince Alice that the mk is sealed in
TPM. Alice then uses mk 1 to encrypt secret. Bob is able to decrypt the ciphertext with mk.
TF also ĕgures out A2 in this case.
For SA1 and SA2, TF reports the leakage of n. Bob can conduct the same attack
as that in NA1. We then extend SA1 to attack all the modules measured by SRTM and DRTM.
TF identiĕes A3 that for SRTM, the TCB should include the CRTM, the BIOS, the
bootloader, the OS and the trusted block, andA4 that for DRTM, the ACM and the trusted block
should be included in the TCB.
For HA1a, TF reports that Bob does not reboot the machine upon receiving Al-
ice's request at Step ¬. Bob then can execute the protocol with Alice and whenever a particular
PCR is required, he just resets the PCR and constructs the expected PCR value. HA1b eaves-
drops all command parameters transferring through the LPC bus, which allows Bob to obtain n.
Attack sequence is similar to NA1. Since the TPM reset attack and LPC attack are targeting the
physical interface, TF reports A5 that proper protection on physical interface should
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be in TCB.HA2 only works for SRTM since DRTM disables DMA for measured code by default.
TF reports that the attacker can modify the OS to the malicious one aer it has been
loaded, as SA1 does. erefore, it ĕgures outA6 that DMA-capable devicesmust be trusted when
SRTM is used.
A Logic Flaw in the Protocol. TF reports a severe logic Ęaw which makes the pro-
tocol vulnerable toHA3. Between the step­ and step®, malicious Bob can reboot his machine
to amalicious state and obtainn at step®. enBob can conduct the same attack asNA1. T-
F raises it as a logic Ęaw because the property violation occurs without any component on
attack. is Ęaw happens because remote attestation only guarantees the integrity of the soware
stack at the attestation time. Aerwards, verifying whether the soware that the attester is inter-
acting with is the one that has been remotely attested has to be achieved by the protocol itself. We
propose a ĕxation which protects the conĕdentiality of n. In particular, aer step ­, the TPM
on Bob's machine generates a key pair (kn; k 1n ) and seals it onto the PCR value which has been
extended the trusted block, such that only the trusted block can use it for decryption. e key
then can be used to protect n during the transmission.
Table 3.1 lists the statistics collected in our experiments. Our experiments were conducted
on a PC with Intel Core i7-940 at 2.93 GHz and 12GB RAM. As can be seen, it requires to explore
signiĕcant numbers of states to detect the security Ęaws, which is infeasible for manual analysis.
3.5.2 Analysis of a Trusted Grid Platform
We apply TF to another trusted platform for cloud computing [86], which can be ab-
stracted as the steps shown in Figure 3.8. Basically, Alice locates her encrypted sensitive program
in the cloud (¬). When the program needs to be executed, Alice attests the soware stack in the
cloud using a typical remote attestation protocol [193] (­-°). If Alice veriĕes that the cloud is
in an expected state, she sends the decryption key to the trusted block (similar to Fig. 3.1).
Experiments and Results. We model this platform in approximately 150 lines of CSP# code.













Figure 3.8: A Trusted Grid Platform
platforms, we derive the same set of assumptions as we expected. Furthermore, TF
ĕnds the following logic Ęaw in this platform when we test the reboot attack (HA3).
A Logic Flaw in the Protocol. Aer Step °, the malicious cloud can reboot to an untrusted
mode, and communicate with Alice to obtain k. is Ęaw occurs because the attestability is
violated. Given the cloud is under complete control of the attacker, an authentication between
Step ° and ± (as suggested in [86]) cannot defeat this attack. To prevent this, Alice can request
a key which is bound to a expected PCR value from the cloud and encrypt k with this key before
sending it to the cloud.
3.6 RelatedWork
A few previous studies have been conducted to formally analyze trusted platforms in the liter-
ature. In these studies, trust platforms are manually modeled in diﬀerent languages. en, the
models are analyzed with various formal analysis tools to check the satisĕability of the proper-
ties. During the analysis, the TPM is regarded as trustworthy and secure, and its functionalities
are modeled and emulated on a highly abstract level. Delaune et al. [91] present a Horn-clause-
based framework for trusted platform analysis, which is featured in sensitiveness of PCR states.
Namiluko andMartin [167] propose an abstract framework for TPM-based system based onCSP.
In their work, a trusted system is abstracted as composition of the subsystems, including the re-
sources and conĕgurations. e TPM is abstracted as a set of processes. Gurgens et al. [114]
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specify the TPM API using FSA (Finite State Automata). All of these works need to model the
TPM commands before analyzing the trusted platforms. erefore, TF can serve as a
foundation for them.
3.7 Summary
WepresentedTF, a formal foundation and framework formodel checking trusted plat-
forms. TF provides an expressive formalism, a formal model of the TPM, and three
categories of threat models. We successfully detect design-level Ęaws and a set of implicit as-
sumptions from two existing trusted platforms.
Similar to most previous formal analysis techniques, TF relies on manually con-
structing analyzable models. However, the manual modeling process is tedious and error-prone.
Even worse, as a system evolves, manually modeling every new version becomes infeasible. To
alleviate this problem, we further seek a way to directly extract analyzable models from the im-
plementations in an automatic way. Our study on themodel extraction is presented in Chapter 4.
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Web authenticationmechanisms evolve fast. Manyweb sites implement their own authentication
protocols and rely on third-partymechanisms tomanage their authentication logic. For example,
recent single sign-on (SSO) mechanisms (e.g., Facebook Connect, SAML-based SSO, OpenID
and BrowserID) have formed the basis of managing user identities in commercial web sites and
mobile applications. For example, OpenID currently manages over one billion user accounts and
has been adopted by over 50,000 web sites, including many well-known ones such as Google,
Facebook and Microso [26]. As another example, Facebook Connect is employed by 2 million
web sites andmore than 250million people reportedly use it everymonth as of 2011 [28]. Ideally,
authentication protocols should be formally veriĕed prior to their implementations. However,
majority of web sites do not follow this principle. Authentication protocols have historically been
hard to design correctly and implementations have been found susceptible to logical Ęaws [206,
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148]. Web authentication protocols are no exception---several of these implementations have
been found insecure in post-deployment analysis [207, 131, 42, 196, 69].
ere are three key challenges in ensuring that applications authenticate and federate user
identities securely. First, most prior protocol veriĕcation work has focused on checking the high-
level protocol speciĕcations, not their implementations [211, 36, 71]. In practice, however, check-
ing implementations is diﬃcult due to lack of complete information, such as missing source code
of some protocol participants. Second, verifying authentication using oﬀ-the-shelf tools requires
expert knowledge and, in most prior work, conversion of authentication protocol speciĕcations
to veriĕcation tools has been done manually. However, several custom authentication proto-
cols are undocumented. As new protocols emerge and the implementations of existing protocols
evolve, manual translation of every new protocol becomes infeasible. Moreover, manual transla-
tion is tedious and can be error-prone. Finally, the authentication of the communication between
protocol participants oen goes beyond the initial establishment of authentication tokens, which
the high-level speciĕcations dictate. In practice, checking the end-to-end authentication of com-
munication involves checking if the authentication tokens are actually used in all subsequent
communications andmaking sure they are not sent on public communication channels or stored
in persistent devices from which they can leak. Techniques to address these practical problems
of existing implementations are an important area which has received relatively lesser attention.
Our Approach. In this work, we present a framework called AS to automatically extract
the formal speciĕcations of authentication protocols from their implementations. en, these
speciĕcations are directly checked for authentication and secrecy properties using oﬀ-the-shelf
veriĕcation tools [62, 19, 87]. AS can automatically conĕrm the candidate attacks gen-
erated by the veriĕcation tools and report the true positives (conĕrmed attacks) in most cases we
study. In some cases, AS does not know the attacker's knowledge set enough to generate
conĕrmed attacks --- in such cases, it generates security warnings containing precise communi-
cation tokens that need to be manually reviewed by the security analyst.
We design an intermediate language TML to bridge the gap between the detailed implemen-
tation of an authentication protocol and its high level semantics that can be used by the veriĕ-
44
4.1. INTRODUCTION
cation tools. We show that TML is suﬃcient to capture the communications between protocol
participants and their internal actions. AS assumes no knowledge of the protocol being
inferred and does not require the full source code of the implementation. We propose a reĕne-
ment method to deal with partial availability of the code implementing the protocol (e.g., if the
code located on a web server is not available). It starts with an initial abstraction of the proto-
col speciĕcation, and iteratively reĕnes the abstraction until it reaches a ĕxpoint. To perform
this reĕnement, we propose a novel hybrid inference approach to combine a whitebox program
analysis with a blackbox diﬀerential fuzzing analysis. In particular, the whitebox analysis per-
forms dynamic symbolic analysis on the available code to extract precise data semantics and the
internal actions of the protocol participants. e blackbox analysis infers the protocol implemen-
tation by probing the protocol participants and comparing the changes in their response. Our
ĕnal inferred speciĕcation in TML can be directly translated into modeling languages used by
oﬀ-the-shelf veriĕcation tools and can be conĕgured to verify against a variety of attacker mod-
els [56, 93].
Our techniques focus on recovering as much protocol semantics as possible from dynamic
executions of the protocol; we do not aim to ĕnd complete speciĕcations. Instead, we aim to
recover fragments of the protocol with enough precision to ĕnd interesting logic Ęaws. We ap-
ply AS to study several real-world web sites, including three popular SSO protocols ---
Facebook Connect Protocol (2 web sites), Browser ID (3 web sites) andWindows LiveMessenger
Connect (1 web site). We also test several standalone web sites which implement their custom
authentication logic and have millions of users sharing personal information. AS suc-
cessfully recovers precise (but partial) models of their authentication logic, and formally veriĕes
their authentication and secrecy properties against a broad range of attacker models. We have
found 7 security Ęaws in these implementations without their prior knowledge---one of these was
found independently by a concurrent work [158] and the remaining are previously unknown. In
particular, we ĕnd two Ęaws in Facebook Connect Protocol and one Ęaw in BrowserID, which
arise because the freshness ofmessages is not guaranteed in the protocol implementations. An at-
tacker is thus able to perpetrate replay attacks to acquire unauthorized authentication credentials.
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Several other vulnerabilities are due to unsafe implementation errors in creating andmaintaining
secrecy of authentication tokens. For example, we ĕnd that a web site employing Windows Live
Messenger Connect grants the end user a publicly known value as a credential aer the user has
been authenticated to Windows Live.
4.2 Challenges & Overview
Security analysts oen need to guarantee the correctness of authentication protocol implementa-
tions without having complete access to the source code. In this section, we explain the problem
and its challenges with an example.
4.2.1 A Running Example
Consider one execution of a hypothetical single sign-on (SSO) protocol (similar to Facebook
Connect) as shown in Figure 4.1-(a). In our example, Alice wants to authenticate herself to a
service provider (SP) web site hosted at sp.com by using her login credentials with an identity
provider (IDP) hosted at idp.com1. is example shows that much of the communication be-
tween the IDP and the SP occurs through the web browser (using postMessage between client-
side iframes), which is similar to real-world protocols [207, 116]. is enables security analysts
to analyze protocol behaviors.
e authentication protocol, which the security analyst aims to infer, is as follows:
 Step ¬: When Alice visits the SP's site and initiates the intent to authenticate, the client-
side SP code sends the pre-registered ID and domain of the SP to the IDP's iframe. e
fact that each SP is pre-registered with the IDP is not known to the security analyst by
observing this protocol execution.
 Step­: Assuming that Alice has already logged into the IDP, the IDP generates an HTTP
request to its backend server. e request contains a nonce (anti-CSRF) and the session ID
of Alice's ongoing web session with the IDP.
1One sample IDP is facebook.com in Facebook Connect and one sample SP is cnn.comwhich uses the Facebook
Connect protocol.
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GET    https://www.idp.com/login?spid=SID&spDomain=sp.  
           com&redirect_url=http://www.idp.com/granter?next= 



















Set-Cookie: cookie1=87654321; domain=.idp.com 
    ---------------------------------------- 
<body onload=foo()> <script> 
    var domain="http://www.sp.com/login"; 
    var authToken="3fa09d24a3ce"; 
    var uEmail="alice@idp.com"; 
    var idpSign="2oOs5u29erIas…“; 
    function foo(){ 
        var message=uEmail+"&"+authToken+"&"+idpSign ; 














    var uEmail=extractUser(event.data); 
    var authToken=extractToken(event.data); 
    var idpSign=extractSign(event.data); 
    var data=uEmail+"&"+authToken; 
    var idpPubKey=loadPubKey(); 
    if(verify(data, idpSign, idpPubKey)){ 
         var message=uEmail+"&" +authToken; 
         var request = $.ajax({url: login, data: { token: message}});} 
    else 
    {…}},false); 
B 
SP server 








SP_C     IDP_C spid, spDomain, next 
q 
IDP_C   IDP_S spid, spDomain, sessionID, CSRFToken 
r 
IDP_S   IDP_C uEmail, authToken, {uEmail, authToken} 
s 
IDP_C   SP_C 
                  (next) 
uEmail, authToken, {uEmail, authToken} 
t 
SP_C   SP_S uEmail, authToken 
����−1  
����−1  
(a)  The process of Alice authenticates herself to the SP though the IDP 
(b) Communication actions of the participants (IDP_C: IDP client 
code, IDP_S: IDP server, SP_C: SP client code, SP_S: SP server) (c) Parts of exchanged HTTP message and client code 
Figure 4.1: An SSO Example: Alice authenticates herself to the SP (sp.com) by using her login
credentialswith the IDP (idp.com). e circled numbers indicate the login process, and the capital
letters stand for client code.
 Step®: e IDP replies with Alice's registered email identity uEmail and an authentica-
tion token authToken, which authorizes all access toAlice's personal information stored at
the IDP.e IDP creates a cryptographic signature over the terms uEmail and authToken
as an authentication credential to be veriĕed by the SP.
 Step¯: Client-side IDP code (code A in Figure 4.1-(c)) relays the HTTP data received in
step® to the SP's iframe.
 Step °: Client-side SP code (code B in Figure 4.1-(c)) veriĕes that the signature is valid
and extracts the uEmail and authToken. e SP's iframe sends Alice's identity and
authToken back to the SP's server. is allows the SP's server to access Alice's information
stored at the IDP, and allows the IDP to log all SP's actions on Alice's data for audit (not
shown).
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e security analyst can only observe the network traﬃc and code execution at the browser
end; the server-side logic of the protocol participants is not available for analysis.
Security Flaws. e protocol has several vulnerabilities. We only describe three of them and they
can be found automatically if the protocol can be inferred precisely:
 Man-in-the-middle (MITM) Attack. e protocol is susceptible to several MITM attacks
by a web attacker. For example, consider the target of the postMessage call in the client-
side code (line 19). is target is derived from an HTTP parameter called next (at line
2 of Figure 4.1-(c)). A malicious SP, say Eve, can change the next parameter to its own
domain, leaving the spid parameter as it is. In this attack, the token granted to the sp.com
is actually sent to Eve by code labeled as A in step ¯. is attack is similar to a recently
reported real-world attack on the site zoho.com employing Facebook Connect [207].
 Replay Attack. e protocol is susceptible to a replay attack, as the IDP's server does
not use any nonce or timestamp to guarantee the freshness of the authentication token
authToken. If a malicious SP obtains the signed assertion in step ¯, it can replay the
message to sp.com in a new web session and log in as Alice.
 Guessable Tokens. Even if the authentication token is kept secret by carefully using only
secure (private) communication channels, additional problems can exist. For example,
authToken remains constant across all of Alice's sessions, which is not apparent from ob-
serving a single protocol run. We refer to such tokens as long-lived tokens. Long-lived
tokens may be used in replay attacks. Similarly, if the IDP uses a weak or guessable scheme
to generate authentication tokens, such as a sequentially incrementing counter, an attacker
can precisely guess the tokens used in other web sessions.
4.2.2 Challenges
is example shows that implementation-dependent security properties need to be checked in
real web applications, where the formal speciĕcations are required. In the following, we list a
number of practical challenges in inferring speciĕcations from their implementations.
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Figure 4.2: Overview of AS
Inferring Semantics. A key challenge is to infer the precise semantics of data elements exchanged
in the communication. For example, it is important to know that authToken remains constant
across all of Alice's sessions with the IDP and does not include a nonce or a timestamp. Inferring
this information is critical to discover the replay attack in the protocol. Similarly, identifying
that the communication target in¯ is not a ĕxed domain but instead a variable derived from the
HTTP parameter next is crucial to ĕnd theMITM attack. ese semantics are not obvious from
the values observed in one message or even in one execution of the protocol.
Partial Code. Only the part of the protocol implementation that executes in the web browser
is visible for analysis. For instance, we can infer using whitebox analysis over the client-side
code that idpSign is a cryptographic signature of uEmail and authToken under the IDP's pri-
vate key. is allows us skip generating random guesses about whether it is possible to forge
the (uEmail; authToken) pair by the attacker. is can signiĕcantly improve the precision,
which we discussed in Section 4.6. In other cases, the exact relationship between data elements
is not directly available via whitebox analysis. For example, no client-side code reveals whether
authToken is tied to sp.com or is the same for all SPs registered with the IDP. Our analysis needs
to infer if there is a one-to-one relation between them.
Redundant Message Elements. Numerous HTTP data elements are contained in the HTTP
traces, but most of them are irrelevant to the authentication protocol. e cookie cookie1 (line
10 in Figure 4.1-(c)) is one of such examples. Including redundant element when using oﬀ-
the-shelf veriĕcation tools can signiĕcantly increase the veriĕcation time or even lead to a non-
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termination. One of the challenges for scalability is to identify and eliminate irrelevant parame-
ters systematically from the traces.
4.2.3 AS Overview
To overcome these challenges, we develop a tool called AS which requires no prior
knowledge of the protocol. AS is a system that aids security analysts. It takes the fol-
lowing three inputs.
 Test Harness. e security analyst provides AS with at least one implementation
of the protocol and provides login credentials (such as username and password) of at least
two test accounts. e analyst can optionally provide additional test cases involving many
diﬀerent users and/or diﬀerent participants (such as diﬀerent SPs) to utilize AS's
full capability---the more test cases, the more precise is the inferred protocol.
 Protocol Principals & Public keys. In each test case, the analyst speciĕes the principals
relevant to the protocol, such as the SP, the IDP and the user being authenticated in the run-
ning example. In addition, AS takes as inputs the interface APIs (web URIs) that
can be queried to obtain public keys of principals involved in the protocol. For instance,
JavaScript function loadPubKey at line 26 in the running example internally makes an
XmlHttpRequest (not shown) to retrieve the public key of the IDP; such web interfaces
need to be identiĕed by the analyst.
 Oracle. AS generates new protocol executions internally during testing. For each
internal run generated, AS needs to query a test oracle that indicates whether au-
thentication is successful or not. For AS, this is speciĕed as an HTTP request that
AS can make to verify a successful completion. In the running example, A-
S can generate anHTTP request to access Alice's personal information at the IDPusing
authToken to check if the protocol run succeeds.
Output. ASproduces two outputs. First, it produces a speciĕcation of the inferred proto-
col, which can act as a starting point for a variety of manual and automatic analysis [56]. Second,
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it produces a vulnerability report for all the attacks that it ĕnds.
Conĕgurable Options. AS is designed to enable checking a variety of security proper-
ties under several diﬀerent attacker models. Additionally, it is designed to incorporate domain
knowledge that the security analyst is willing to provide to improve the precision. Wenext explain
these conĕgurable parameters of our system and defaults.
 Attacker Models. By default, AS checks for Ęaws against two standard attacker
models: the network attacker [93] and the web attacker [56, 40]. However, it is possible
to extend these models with new ones. For example, we can consider a ĕlesystem attacker
which steals authorization tokens stored on the client device. Such attacks have been found
recently on the Android DropBox application [29].
 Security Properties. By default, AS checks for authentication of the inferred pro-
tocols. Checking authentication corresponds to two precise, formal deĕnitions provided
in previous work: injective correspondences [149] and secrecy [211]. Additional properties
can be added to AS.
 Cryptographic Functions Names. AS needs to infer the functions which imple-
ment cryptographic primitives such as signature veriĕcation, hashes and so on, in the
executed client-side JavaScript code (e.g. verify at line 27 in Figure 4.1-(c)). By de-
fault, AS performs this automatically. It has a built-in list of browser APIs (such
as Window.postMessage()) and popular JavaScript libraries that provide such func-
tions (such as Node.js [16] and Mozilla jwcrypto [30]). In addition, it has a small set of
standardized cryptographic primitives. It can identify functions in the executed client-side
code that mimic the behavior of these standardized functions using blackbox testing2.
Security analysts can improveAS's precision and eﬃciency by providing additional
names of JavaScript source code functions that compute cryptographic function terms.
2Alternative heavy-weight methods (e.g., [208]) to identify cryptographic functions using whitebox analyses are
possible.
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4.3 AS System Design
In this section, we present an overview of our techniques and introduce an intermediate language
called TML to capture the full semantics of the extracted protocol.
4.3.1 Approach Overview
Figure 4.2 shows the internal design steps in our system. AS performs three high-level
steps: protocol extraction, protocol veriĕcation and attack conĕrmation.
In the protocol extraction step, AS iteratively processes test cases one-by-one from
its input test harness until the test harness is exhausted. For each test case, it records the network
HTTP(S) traﬃc and client-side JavaScript code execution traces through a web browser. Using
this information, AS generates an initial abstraction of the protocol speciĕcation. It then
performs a reĕnement process to subsequently obtain more precise speciĕcations3. In each re-
ĕnement step, AS employs a hybrid inference technique which combines both whitebox
program analysis on the JavaScript code (if available) and blackbox fuzzing. e reĕnement pro-
cess stops if a ĕxpoint is reached (i.e., no new semantics can be inferred). Our protocol extraction
techniques are detailed in Section 4.4.
At the end of the protocol extraction step, AS generates a protocol speciĕcation in an
intermediate language called TML, which can capture the actions executed by each participant
and the semantics of the data exchanged in the protocol execution. AS converts TML
to applied pi-calculus, which is a widely-used speciĕcation language for security protocols. is
protocol speciĕcation then can be automatically checked using oﬀ-the-shelf veriĕcation tools for
various security properties, against diﬀerent attackers. In this work, we use ProVerif [62] and
PAT [195] as the veriĕcation tools because they canmodel an unbounded number of parallel ses-
sions4. AS models various semantic restrictions, such as the same-origin policy, HTTP
headers like Referrer, cookies, secure channels (HTTPS, origin-speciĕed postMessage),
3Byprecise, wemean that each reĕnement containsmore expressive semantics about actions performedbyprotocol
participants and more relationships between data terms exchanged in the protocol.
4In this thesis, we only use ProVerif to explain our idea. Bounded-state model checkers like AVISPA [19] can also
be used but are not implemented as backends yet.
52
4.3. AUTHSCAN SYSTEM DESIGN
and insecure channels (HTTP, unchecked postMessages), before querying oﬀ-the-shelf ver-
iĕcation tools for precise reasoning, as detailed in [56]. Oﬀ-the-shelf veriĕcation tools verify
these security properties and generate counterexamples which violate the properties. e coun-
terexamples serve as unconĕrmed or candidate attacks.
e last step of AS is attack conĕrmation step. In principle, our techniques can
generate imprecise protocol speciĕcations; therefore, some of the candidate attacks may not be
true security Ęaws. AS can conĕrm HTTP attacks by converting counterexamples into
HTTP network traﬃc, relaying them in a live setting and conĕrming true positives using the
analyst-speciĕed oracle. In the cases where AS does not know the attacker's knowledge
set enough to generate conĕrmed attacks, it generates security warnings containing precise com-
munication tokens that need to be manually reviewed by the security analyst.
4.3.2 Target Model Language
esemantics of our inferred authentication protocol is represented in an abstract language called
Target Model Language (TML). TML serves as a bridge between protocol implementations and
formal models supported by veriĕcation tools. It captures enough implementation-level details
to check correctness, and at the same time, it can be translated into formal speciĕcations that can
be used as inputs to oﬀ-the-shelf security protocol veriĕcation tools.
We design TML based on the language proposed by Woo and Lam [211], referred as WL
model in this work; we add new extensions which are necessary for our protocol inference. We
explain the TML semantics in an intuitive way here to ease understanding; the terminology used
(underlined) has precise semantics as deĕned in WL [211]. e TML representation of our run-
ning example is shown in Figure 4.3.
TML Syntax. TML represents an authentication protocol as a protocol schema. AS ob-
serves several concrete executions of a protocol, each of which is an instantiation of the protocol
schema---for instance, our running example is an instantiation of our target protocol with two
speciĕc participants namely idp.com and sp.com. Formally, the protocol schema is a 2-tuple
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Initial Conditions
(I1) 8x; y : x has y
(I2) 8x; y : x has key(x; y) ^ y has key(x; y)
(I3) 8x; y : x has ky
(I4) r has sessionIDr ^ p has sessionIDr
(I5) r has CSRFTokenr ^ p has CSRFTokenr
(I6) Z has assoc(i; authtoken)
(I7) i has kB ^ r has kB
SP C(i) Protocol
SC1: BeginInit(j)
SC2: NewAssoc(fp; ig; assoc(j; spid))
SC3: Send(r;f[assoc(j; spid); next]gkB ) // Step¬











IC1: Receive(i;fX;Y gkB ) //Step¬
IC2: Send(p;ffX; sessionIDr; CSRFTokenrggkey(r;p))
//Step­
IC3: Receive(p;ffM;N;Pggkey(r;p))//Step®
IC4: Send(Y;f[M;N;P ]gkB )//Step¯
IDP S(p) Protocol
IS1: Receive(r;ffassoc(T; U); sessionIDr;
CSRFTokenrggkey(r;p)) //Step­
IS2: NewAssoc(fp; jg; assoc(i; authtoken))





Figure 4.3: e TML Model of Running Example in Figure 4.1. M, N, P, T and U are variables. I2 and
the session keys in IC2, IC3, IS1 and IS3model HTTPS communication. Cross domain restrictions
by the browser's SOP are modeled as encryption using the key kB (initialized in I7). j and p are identities
of SP and IDP respectively, i.e., their domains. e behavior of Alice is modeled together on SP client side,
thus i stands for Alice's uEmail which is Alice's identity. sessionID and CSRFToken have been inferred
to be nonces (I4 and I5). e authToken is inferred to be guessable (I6).
(Init; ProSet). e ProSet is a set of local protocols fP1(X1); P2(X2); : : : Pi(Xi)g, where
each local protocol Pi is executed by a protocol participantXi. e local protocol speciĕes a se-
quence of actions that one participant can perform. e complete speciĕcation is characterized
by a set of local protocols to be executed by multiple participants. Xi are variables in the schema
that may be instantiated by concrete principals (such as idp.com) in a protocol instance. e
second part of the protocol schema is a set of initial conditions Init, such as the initial knowledge
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set of each protocol participant prior to the start of the protocol. In the TML of our running ex-
ample (Figure 4.3), we infer 7 initial conditions (I1-I7); we explain how these are derived during
protocol extraction in Section 4.4.
Actions. In executing a local protocol, the participant executes a sequence of actions. Actions
can be either communication actions, which send/receive messages with other participants, or
internal actions which result in updating local state (or, formally the knowledge set) of that par-
ticipant. ese actions are listed in Table 4.1. e semantics of these actions are fairly intuitive as
their names suggest, with the exception of NewAssocwhich is explained later in this section. For
example, BeginInit(r) states that an initiator of the protocol begins its role with a responder r.
EndInit(r) states that the initiator ends the protocol with the responder r; BeginRespond(i) and
EndRespond(i) are similarly deĕned with i being the initiator. Send(p;M) or Receive(p;M)
means sending or receivingM to/from p, respectively. NewNonce(n) is the action of generating
a nonce. NewKeyPair(k; k 1) is the action of generating an asymmetric key pair, where k is the
public key and k 1 is the private key. NewSecret(S; n) indicates the action of generating a secret,
which is intended to be shared with (or distributed to) a set of principals S. Secrets can be data
elements such as shared session keys. e secret distribution is only complete when all partici-
pants for whom the secret is intended have explicitly executed the Accept(N) action. Note that
a participant following a local protocol only executes an action aer it executes the preceding ac-
tion state in the schema. As a result of executing certain actions, such asNewNonce and Accept,
participants update their knowledge sets. Intuitively, a participant's knowledge set includes the
data terms that it possesses or can compute, which can be used by the participant in communi-
cation messages. e attacker, denoted by the principal Z throughout this thesis, is assumed to
follow no local protocol and is free to execute any action at any step under the constraints of its
knowledge set and the capability of the assumed attacker model.
Terms. We aim to recover as much semantics of the data exchanged and the internal state main-
tained for each participant as possible. To characterize these semantics, TML provides three
kinds of terms: constant symbols, function symbols and variable symbols5. Constant symbols
5is typesetting is kept consistent with theWLmodel paper [211]. e constant symbols are typeset in Sans Serif
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Send(p;M) NewAssoc(S, assoc(m1; : : : ;mn) )
Receive(p;M)
include names of principals (web origins), nonces, keys and integer constants. Function sym-
bols include the encryption function fg , the shared key function key(; ), the concatenation
function [; :::; ], the set construction function f; :::; g and the arithmetic functions (+, ,/,,
and modulo). e public key and private key of a principal P are denoted by kP and k 1P , re-
spectively. e symmetric key shared by principles P andQ is denoted by key(P;Q). A term is
ground if it only consists of constants and function symbols. Finally, variable symbols represent
terms which are not ground.
We aim to recover the precise relationships between terms exchanged in the protocol. For ex-
ample, our analysis infers that the value of idpSign is the signature of uEmail concatenatedwith
authToken, as can be seen at line 27 of the running example---this translates to the statement
labelled IS3 in Figure 4.3. If a participant receives a data element whose precise semantics is not
known by the receiver, we represent this data as a variable in TML. For example, consider SC4 in
Figure 4.3, we model the messages on the receiver side as variablesM andN ; the participantXi
executing local protocol Pi in the schema is a variable; the responder r in the BeginInit(r) is also
a variable which will be instantiated with concrete values in an execution instance of a protocol
schema.
New Extensions in TML. TML extends theWLmodel with three new extensions. e semantics
of other operations are deĕned in theWLmodel; we discusswhy these extensions are needed. e
ĕrst extension is arithmetic function symbols. ese operations are oen utilized in generating
sequence numbers from nonces, and, oen lead to weak or predictable tokens. Our TML can
capture such weak constructions and subject them to testing.
font, the adversary is referred to as the principal Z and the universe of principals is the set SYS. Lower case variables
stand for terms that are constant symbols, while upper case variables stand for arbitrary terms.
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e second extension is a function symbol called association relation, which is written as
assoc(m1; : : : ;mn) to associaten variables,m1 tomn. Association relation is necessary because
while reconstructing the semantics from implementations, we sometimes cannot infer the exact
relation between the terms even though we can infer that they are related. For instance, in the
running example, we can infer that authToken (line 14, Figure 4.1) does not change during the
sessions of the same user, and hence it is related to the user's identity, but the exact semantic
relation is unknown. In this scenario, AS generates an association assoc(i; authtoken)
to indicate that the two terms are related as a key-value pair, but without the exact relation known.
e third extension we introduce in TML is an internal action which is called NewAs-
soc(S; assoc(m1; : : : ;mn)). is action means that the association assoc(m1; : : : ;mn) is
known or becomes shared among the principals listed in the set S. To see why the sharing among
S is needed, consider the following scenario. Principals P and Q possess a mutual shared se-
cret k, that is known prior to the execution. P sends Q a messagem in the client browser, both
participants send m back to their backend servers, and their servers later respond with entity
fmgk in subsequent HTTP messages observed in the browser. AS observes that P and
Q compute the same term from m in the code hidden on their servers, but it cannot infer the
exact relation between fmgk andm because it does not know that k is a pre-exchanged shared
secret. Under such situations, AS introduces aNewAssoc action in the inferred protocol
schema to specify that this association is known to both P and Q. e step SC2 in Figure 4.3
shows how this relation is captured at TML.
We deĕne the semantics for these extensions, which extends the original semantic model
of the WL model in the following way. We introduce an association table for each princi-
pal to record the principal's knowledge of associations. When a principal executes NewAs-
soc(S; assoc(m1; : : : ;mn)), the assoc(m1; : : : ;mn) is added into the association table of each
principal in S. Note that the attacker (i.e., Z) is not allowed to update the association table. When
a principal receives an association, it checks implicitly if the association is stored in its table.
Assumptions in TML. We make the following assumptions in TML.
 Correct Cryptographic Algorithms. TML assumes that the cryptographic algorithms
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used in the protocol are ideal. We do not aim to detect vulnerabilities in the implementa-
tions of the cryptographic primitives.
 Distinct Secret Keys and Nonces. TML assumes the encryption/decryption keys are kept
secret prior to the protocol, and are distinct (i.e., cannot be guessed).
 Knowledge of Principals. We make the assumption on the knowledge of the principals:
Each principal knows the identiĕers or names of other principals (represented as (I1) in
Figure 4.3). is assumes that the DNS infrastructure has no vulnerability.
4.4 Protocol Extraction Techniques
In this section, we give the details of the hybrid inference approach to address the challenges in
Section 4.2.2.
4.4.1 Overview of Protocol Extraction
Our protocol extraction technique operates on the input test harness, one test case at a time.
Figure 4.4 shows an overview of the protocol extraction process.
As the ĕrst step, the abstraction initialization component in our system creates an initial ab-
straction of the protocol from the ĕrst test case in the test harness. It takes HTTP traces (captured
by our trace capturing component shown in Figure 4.2) and the initial knowledge provided by the
analyst as inputs. e initial abstraction of the inferred protocol is in the form of a TML protocol
schema (Init; ProSet). By utilizing the test cases from the test harness one-by-one, AS
iteratively reĕnes the abstract protocol using our hybrid inference technique discussed in this sec-
tion. During each iteration of the hybrid inference, AS gradually reĕnes the semantics
of terms and actions of the protocol schema until no new semantics can be discovered.
4.4.2 Protocol Reĕnement Algorithm
e protocol reĕnement algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. e inputs of the algorithm are
the initial knowledge InitK (i.e., the test harness, protocol participants & public keys of par-
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Figure 4.4: AS's Protocol Extraction Process
Algorithm 2 Abstraction Reĕnement Algorithm
Input: InitK : initial knowledge, t: test trace
Output: PS: protocol schema
1: (Init; ProSet) absInit(t; InitK);
2: ProSetold  null;
3: trPool: a trace list, initially empty
4: while ProSet 6= ProSetold do
5: ProSetold  ProSet;
6: ProSet JSAnalysis(t; ProSet);
7: (ProSet; T ) Blackbox(t; ProSet; InitK; trPool);
8: trPool:add(T );
9: end while
10: return (Init; ProSet);
ticipants and oracle, outlined in Section 5.3.3), and a trace t generated from one test case. A
trace is a sequence of messages (a0; a1; :::; an), where ai represents either an HTTP(S) request,
response (which may contain JavaScript programs), or a cross-domain communication message
over postMessage. We refer to all data exchanged in the trace as HTTP data, which includes
HTTP parameters, cookies, postMessage data, HTML form data, JSON data, and so on. A-
S's trace capturing step identiĕes the HTTP(S) request/response pairs from the trace. e
output of the algorithm is one inferred protocol schema.
Our reĕnement algorithm (Algorithm 2) has two steps: abstraction initialization (line 1) and
reĕnement process (line 4-9). e absInitmethod (line 1) returns an abstract protocol schema
(Init; ProSet). Init is a set of predicates, which stands for the initial knowledge of the prin-
cipals. Some of these are derived from the assumptions of TML (outlined in Section 4.3.2), e.g.,
I1   I3 shown in Figure 4.3. Other TML terms model the communication channels that are
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used in the protocol. For example, to model the HTTPS channels and cross-domain commu-
nication channels, we internally introduce symmetric keys (I6 in Figure 4.3), as we explain in
Section 4.5.2. For every message a in test trace t, if the sender or the receiver of a is not con-
tained in ProSet, absInit inserts a new local protocol into the ProSet. en, absInit adds
two communication actions (Send and Receive) into the sender's and receiver's protocol, respec-
tively. In addition, absInit can identify some constant terms in the HTTP data, such as the
domains of principals, user accounts and public keys of web sites available as the security ana-
lyst's inputs to AS. AS identiĕes them by matching the value of HTTP data with
the values in the analyst's inputs. For example, i, r and kIDP S are identiĕed in this way; they
stand for the identity of SP, the identity of IDP and the public key of IDP, respectively. At the end
of this step, other HTTP data, which cannot be inferred here, are represented as variable terms
whose semantics are inferred in the reĕnement process explained next. e Begin* and End*
events are also inserted into the local protocols indicating the SP's client and server.
In the reĕnement step (line 5-8), AS reĕnes the initial abstraction by utilizing more
test cases. is step combines whitebox symbolic analysis (JSAnalysis at line 6) and a blackbox
analysis (Blackbox at line 7).
Whitebox Program Analysis. e JSAnalysis procedure uses dynamic symbolic analysis (at
line 6) to infer the function terms and the internal actions of the principals. Dynamic symbolic
analysis (similar to previous work [186]) is used to obtain symbolic formulae which capture the
relations among the HTTP data. ese symbolic formulae are over the theory of TML terms,
which include arithmetic operations, concatenation function, cryptographic operations and un-
interpreted functions. We introduce uninterpreted functions tomodel semantics unknown func-
tion calls, such as calls to browser APIs or JavaScript functions which have many arithmetic and
bitwise operations characteristic of cryptographic operations. For the code fragment marked B
in our running example (Figure 4.1), if the input value for the variable event.data is a string
"u&t&s", the following symbolic formulae are generated by this step:
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(1) uEmail := u; (2) authToken := t;
(3) idpSign := s; (4) data := [u; t];
(5) idpPubKey := loadPubKey();
(6) verify([u; t]; s; idpPubKey);
(7) message := [u; t];
(8) request := $:ajax(login; [u; t]);
To precisely identify cryptographic function terms in the symbolic formulae, AS
needs to identify JavaScript functions implementing cryptographic signature, encryption, ran-
dom number generation, public key fetching functions and so on. From the above symbolic for-
mulae example,JSAnalysis can identify thatidpSign is the term f[uEmail; authToken]gk 1IDP ,
once AS knows that the semantics of the JavaScript procedure verify(data; sig; key).
By default, AS identiĕes these functions based on its built-in list of browser APIs and
JavaScript libraries that provide such functions [16]. AS tries to concretely match the
semantics of all symbolic terms identiĕed as uninterpreted functions in the symbolic formulae
to one of known cryptographic functions in its built-in list. For example, AS can test
verify with the same inputs as the standard RSA signature veriĕcation function from its built-
in list and compare the outputs. Security analysts can also provide annotations for source code
functions to identify custom implementations of standard cryptographic primitives, in case the
default list is not suﬃcient. In this way, several variables are replaced with newly inferred TML
terms in this step. For an uninterpreted function whose semantics cannot be inferred in this step,
AS uses an assoc to represent it. e assoc associates the output of the function with
the inputs.
Based on the extracted symbolic formulae, JSAnalysis infers the function terms and some
internal actions in local protocols. For example, if an HTTP data is identiĕed as a session key,
AS treates the principal which ĕrst sends it in the communication as generator of this
session key. AS infers that this principal has performed a NewSecret action and the
principals which receive it have performed Accept actions. If a principal invokes an asymmetric
key pair generation function, AS adds a NewKeyPair action to the principal's protocol.
Blackbox Diﬀerential Fuzzing Analysis. e blackbox analysis (at line 7) further reĕnes the
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output of the whitebox analysis by trying to infer more TML terms and actions while treating the
participant implementations as a blackbox. Our blackbox diﬀerential fuzzing analysis takes as
input the trace t, the reĕned abstraction aerwhitebox analysis, and the initial knowledge InitK .
eĕrst substep in blackbox fuzzing is to remove certain redundant data tomake blackbox testing
more eﬃcient. Next, the blackbox inference algorithm infers TML terms in two ways: for some
terms, it generates "probe"messages and compares the outputs, whereas for other terms, it merely
makes the inference based on the observed traces without generating new probes. We describe
the redundant data elimination, probe-based inference and non-probe-based inference substep
separately. In each iteration of the blackbox fuzzing step, AS internally generates new
traces and keeps them in a local trace pool (trPool in Algorithm 1). ese traces are not fed
back to the initial test harness, and are used only during the blackbox and whitebox steps.
Eliminating Redundant Data. e goal of this step is to identify HTTP data that do not
contribute towards the authentication protocol. In this step, we check each HTTP data element
by generating a probe message with this element removed. If the probe message results in a
successful authentication, we remove the element and all of its occurrences in previous messages.
AS performs this operation iteratively for each request/response pairs starting from the
last pair and proceeding backwards in t.
Probe-based Inference. emain idea of this fuzzing step is to mutate or remove the HTTP
data in the request messages of t, while keeping others unchanged. ese modiĕed "probe" mes-
sages are sent to the protocol participants and their responses are compared for diﬀerences. In
addition, to prevent the explosion of number of HTTP traces, we capture at most three traces for
each test user account and at most 10 test user accounts for each web site. AS identiĕes
the semantics of several types of HTTP data: URLs, HTTP parameters, web addresses, JSON
data, JSONWeb tokens, and web cookies. To do this identiĕcation, it uses simple pattern match-
ing rules over the values of the data. For instance, a string which has sub-strings separated by
"&", with each segment as a key-value pair separated by a "=", is treated as an HTTP param-
eter list. Similar syntactic properties are used for common web objects such as JSONs, JWT,
cookies and so on. Once the HTTP data type is inferred, AS makes use of the type in-
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formation to speed up the fuzzing process. For example, if AS infers that a string is an
HTTP parameter-value list, it mutates each key value pair in this string separately. Similarly,
if AS infers that a string represents a user identity (like usernames) or a web address,
it mutates the value of this HTTP data into another user's ID or another web address, instead
of trying random modiĕcations. AS also incorporates simple pattern-matching rules to
identify if values are encoded using common encoding methods such as URLEncode/URLDe-
code, Base64-encode, HexEncode, HTMLEncode and JavaScript string literal encode, based on
the use of special characters. For anHTTP data with completely unknown semantics, AS
uses pattern-matching techniques to label it as one of primitive types (Integer, Bool, or String).
Once the basic types are identiĕed, AS then infers the TML terms and actions. From
the traces in the local trace pool, AS attempts to ĕrst identify arithmetic function terms,
which in turn enables the modeling of weak or guessable tokens. For Integer- or String- typed
value of an HTTP data parameter that change across sessions, AS uses the following
mechanism to check if it is generated using a predictable arithmetic function. Given such a string
value (say str), AS ĕrst conducts a substring matching between its instances across vari-
ous traces and extracts the parts that are not common between these instances. AS then
checks if these values form simple arithmetic sequences adding or subtracting a constant. If the
function is identiĕed, AS treats it as a guessable token, and conĕrms it by predicating its
value and probing the server (discussed in Section 4.5.3). We plan to integrate more powerful
oﬀ-the-shelf tools, such as Wolfram Alpha, which take such value sequences as inputs and out-
put a closed form arithmetic expression to match it [31]. AS also marks any data value
which is too short (L  4 characters by default and conĕgurable) as guessable short-length to-
kens, as these values may be subject to exhaustive search. For example, in the case where L = 4,
the search space is less than 2 million ((10 + 26)4), assuming that the term only consists of
case-insensitive alpha-numeric characters; AS presently does not actually generate these
probes butmodels such values as attacker's knowledge (as detailed in Section 4.5.2), and generates
security warnings.
Next, AS infers two kinds of associations using techniques similar to those proposed
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by Wang et. al. [207]. One kind of association is among HTTP data. AS replaces the
value of an HTTP data x in message ai, while keeping the rest unchanged. en it sends this
"probe" message and compares the response message. If HTTP response ~y changes, AS
introduces an assoc(x; ~y). Other kinds of association relations are between HTTP data and a
web principal or users. Similarly, AS identiĕes these associations by using diﬀerential
analysis on multiple traces. e HTTP data which remain constant among the same user's mul-
tiple sessions are inferred to be associated to the user; those remaining constant among diﬀerent
users' sessions are inferred to be associated with a web principal (such as the SP or IDP). All re-
maining HTTP data that change in all such probes are inferred to be nonces (NewNonce), such
as session IDs.
Identifying Association Principals. e S in NewAssoc(S,...) stands for the principals who
share the knowledge of the association terms. AS identiĕes these principals by observing
which terms in an assoc appear in the responses from the protocol participants. en, it probes
these participants by replacing the associated terms with random values. If a principal rejects the
fuzzing message, we infer that it knows how to compute the relationship, and add a NewAssoc
with these participants in S.
Non-Probe Based Inference. e non-probe based inference infers three kinds of function
symbols: cryptographic functions, set functions and concatenation functions. AS em-
ploys brute-force search to identify cryptographic functions. It takes every combination of all
HTTP data elements and checks if they can be used as inputs to a standard cryptographic prim-
itive to produce another data element. We bound the function nesting depth of terms to be less
than 5. In our experiments, we ĕnd that this bound is reasonable since all our analyzed protocols
do not use nomore than 4 levels of nesting cryptographic constructions. is search strategy has
been suﬃcient in practice for our experiments on real-world protocols. For example, as discussed
in our BrowserID case study (Section 4.6), AS successfully identities that oneHTTP data
element is signed by the IDP, and that the signed elements are the ID and the user's public key.
AS identiĕes the concatenation functions by using a substring search over all combina-
tions of HTTP data elements. For the set construction functions, if a single message contains
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multiple data, AS assigns them to a set.
4.5 Protocol Analysis & Attack Conĕrmation
Aer extracting a TML model, AS translates it into applied pi-calculus, which is taken
as input to ProVerif [62] to check security properties against attack models. We leave the details
of this process to Appendix A; and in this section, we discuss the security properties, attacker
models and how candidate attacks are checked to conĕrm security Ęaws.
4.5.1 Security Properties
By default, AS checks the correctness of two essential security properties in its applied
pi-calculus version, authentication of an authentication protocol [211] and secrecy of credential
tokens. A protocol achieves authentication if each principal is sure about the identity of the
principal whom it is communicating with. Authentication is checked using injective correspon-
dence ( , or injective agreement) [211, 149, 65, 63], which can check whether two local proto-
cols are executing in "lock-step" fashion, i.e., whether there is an injective mapping between the
execution of two participant's protocols. For instance, in our running example, whenever ĕn-
ishing executing EndRespond(i), SP S believes that SP C has executed the protocol with him;
thus, to guarantee authentication, SP C must have executed BeginInit(j), i.e., EndRespond(i)
 BeginInit(j) (inj-event(EndRespond(i))==>inj-event(BeginInit(j)) in applied pi-
calculus). Authentication is violated if SP S believes SP C has executed the protocol with him,
but actually it is Z who has.
Additionally, an authentication protocol may introduce some credentials and thus secrecy of
them needs to be guaranteed. Secrecy is deĕned as querying a term from the attacker Z's knowl-
edge set [211]. e secrecy of a term a is speciĕed as Z has a (query attacker(a) in applied
pi-calculus), which queries whether a is derivable by Z aer the execution of the authentication
protocols. If Z has a aer the protocol, the protocol fails to guarantee the secrecy of a. By default,
AS checks the secrecy of terms used for authentication (such as the sessionID in the
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running example); the attack analyst can add more queries to check the secrecy of other terms,
for example, credentials for resource access (such as OAuth token in OAuth 2.0). For long-lived
tokens, AS adds them to Z's knowledge set before querying ProVerif. In general, Zmay
know a long-lived token's value (through external knowledge) even if it is not sent on a public
channel; AS conservatively models this scenario and raises a security warning to alert
the analyst. For guessable tokens, AS adds the outputs of the arithmetic operations to
Z's knowledge set. In the attack conĕrmation step, these guessable values are computed and used
as we detail in Section 4.5.3.
4.5.2 Attacker Models
In this work, we consider two diﬀerent attacker models, namely the network attacker [93] and
the web attacker [40]. Previous work (e.g., [56]) has shown that these attackers can be captured
in ProVerif. Hence, we ignore the detailed modeling and just give an overview in this section.
For example, attacker model in the running example is demonstrated in Appendix A. Note that
both the attacker models are checked individually in AS, since ProVerif terminates aer
ĕnding a counterexample.
Network Attacker. We model the network attacker using the Dolev-Yao model [93], that is, an
active network attacker is able to eavesdrop all messages and control the contents of unencrypted
messages in the public network under the constraints of cryptographic primitives. In TML, we
model HTTPS by assuming that the SSL certiĕcate checking and handshake are complete before
the protocol starts; we model the session key between the two communicating principals x and y
with a key function key(x; y) (I2 in Figure 4.3). In applied pi-calculus, we model HTTPS using
private channels, which are neither readable nor writable by the attacker (shown in Appendix A).
Note that modeling the HTTP network attacker is available from ProVerif directly.
Web Attacker. We also reuse web attacker models described in prior work [56, 40]. ese
models include modeling the same-origin restrictions; for example, the fact that client-side SP
code cannot intercept IDP server's messages is implied in the applied pi-calculus semantics that
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the local variables of a process are inaccessible by another process. We model HTTP headers
like Referrer which correspond to the client-side code sending its identity in the messages; of
course, if the header is not checked by the server, it will not be inferred in our speciĕcation as it is
removed as a redundant element. We also model the semantics of postMessage by encrypting
all messages transmitted through postMessage with a key (kB in IC4 and SC4, Figure 4.3). If
AS ĕnds (bywhitebox analysis) that the receiver or sender origin ĕelds are not checked,
it casts kB to the attacker such that the attacker is able to read and write the postMessage chan-
nel. e anti-CSRF tokens are not needed to be explicitly modeled in the attacker model as they
are observed in the HTTP network messages and are inferred to be nonces if they are relevant
to the protocol (I4 and I5 in Figure 4.3). We assume that the attacker has the ability to redirect
the user agent to a malicious web site. We do not model web attackers with the ability to perform
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks and complex social-engineering attacks in this work.
4.5.3 Candidate Attack Conĕrmation
AS conĕrms candidate attacks generated by ProVerif in this step. If a protocol fails to sat-
isfy the security properties, ProVerif generates a counterexample, which consists of the attacker's
actions, the attacker's input/output and details the terms computed by Z at each step using it's
knowledge set at that step. AS re-constructs the candidate attack probe from this infor-
mation. For all terms computed at each step, AS substitutes the concrete values for these
terms. For guessable tokens that are computed from arithmetic functions, AS evaluates
the function to calculate the next concrete value. For short-size guessable tokens, AS
only raises a security warning. To map symbols and variables in ProVerif counterexamples to
concrete values observed in the HTTP traces, AS maintains the mapping between the
original HTTP messages and the protocol statement generated during the protocol extraction.
us, ASmaps back a ProVerif action sequence and terms in the ProVerif counterexam-
ple to the ProVerif input, which inturn is mapped to the raw HTTP message. Once the messages
are constructed, AS replays the candidate attack probe. During this process, it queries
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the oracle provided by the analyst to check whether the attack is successful.
Currently, AS automates conĕrmation of attacks overHTTP, over postmessage and
via a web attacker-controlled iframe. In cases which AS cannot conĕrm with concrete
attack instances, it reports security warnings containing the communicated data it suspects. Such
cases include the use of long-lived token in authentication, secrecy of which is not known in
the inferred protocol but conservatively modeled as discussed in Section 4.5.2, and the use of
guessable short-length tokens.
4.6 Evaluation
We have built an implementation of AS in approximately 5K lines of C# code, and 3K
lines of JavaScript code. e HTTP trace recording and blackbox fuzzing functionalities are im-
plemented in a Firefox add-on. e JavaScript trace extraction is implemented by instrumenting
the web browser to generate execution traces in a format similar to JASIL [187]. We developed
our own implementation of dynamic symbolic analysis for extracting the TML terms from the
execution traces.
4.6.1 Evaluation Subjects
To estimate the eﬀectiveness of AS on real-world protocols, we test several implementa-
tions of popular SSO protocols and standalone web sites that implement their custom authenti-
cation logic. e inferred protocols are presented in Appendix B.2. Our results are summarized
in Table 4.2.
BrowerID. BrowserID [3] is an SSO service proposed by Mozilla, which is used by several
Mozilla-based services such as BugZilla and MDN, as well as some other service providers. We
test three diﬀerent SP implementations of BrowserID. Although BrowserID is open-source, most
of protocols do not provide the detailed implementation on the server-side. To account for this,
we only take into consideration the client-side JavaScript code and HTTP messages to make our
analysis approach more general. AS manages to infer the general protocol speciĕcation
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Table 4.2: Statistics in Our Experiments
Column 2: ratio of messages ĕltered out by AS w.r.t. the total number of messages occurred in the protocol;
Column 3: ratio of parameters ĕltered out by AS w.r.t. the total number of parameters used in the messages;
Column 4: total execution time of AS; Column 5: veriĕcation time of running ProVerif without and with
ĕltering of the messages or HTTP data, under the network attacker, where "-" means nontermination in veriĕcation;
Column 6: number of rounds; Column 7: number of bugs found in each web site (with repeats); there are 7 distinct
(without over-counting) vulnerabilities.
Web Sites % Redundant % Redundant Time(s) Veriĕcation Time (s) Fuzzing Bugs
Msgs (Total) Elems (Total) WO / W Filter Rounds
myfavoritebeer.com 88% (80) 50% (12) 113 204/3.0 20 2
openphoto.me 82% (93) 75% (24) 72 726/3.0 22 2
developer.mozilla.org 87% (127) 74% (23) 96 -/3.0 28 0
ebayclassiĕeds.com 72% (58) 57% (152) 127a -/58.7 107 2
familybuilder.com 97% (290) 51% (144) 110a -/58.7 77 1
weibo.com 97% (176) 98% (52) 30 0.36/0.03 78 1
iyermatrimony.com 98% (120) 67% (9) 5.33 1.14/0.04 510 1
meetingmillionaires.com 96% (54) 0% (5) 4.72 1.05/0.04 30 1
a e period that AS halts until Facebook allows to resume fuzzing is not taken into account.
from these three implementations, ĕnding only one crucial diﬀerence across the implementa-
tions (explained in Section 4.6.2).
Facebook Connect. Facebook Connect [8] is one of the most widely used incarnations of the
OAuth 2.0 published by Facebook. We test two SP web sites using this protocol. e experiments
are conducted on the basis of client-side JavaScript code and HTTP messages. AS infers
the general protocol speciĕcation successfully.
Windows Live ID. Windows LiveMessenger Connect [27] is another SSO protocol derived from
the general OAuth 2.0 speciĕcation. We test its implementation using the SinaWeibo service---a
China-based web site similar to Twitter and has over 300 million users. AS successfully
extracts the protocol from this implementation; we skip the protocol diagram (which is similar
to Facebook Connect) for the sake of space.
StandaloneWebSites. We also test two standalone sites, where users share deeply personal infor-
mation, both of which have from hundreds of thousands to millions of users and utilize custom




4.6.2 Protocol Analysis and Vulnerabilities
We test AS on 8 implementations (as shown in Table 4.2). We successfully ĕnd 7 secu-
rity vulnerabilities, all of which we have responsibly disclosed to the developers of the web sites.
For the sake of space, we leave the details on how AS extracts protocol speciĕcation to
Appendix B.1; and in this section, we brieĘy present the found vulnerabilities in the protocol
implementations.
Setup. In our experiment, the input and conĕguration to AS include:
 Test harness. e security analyst is required to input two pre-registered user accounts (for
example, email and password in BrowserID), except for the IyerMatrimony case inwhich
ĕve are needed.
 Protocol principals & public keys. For the SSO implementation (including BrowserID, Face-
book Connect and Windows Live ID), the analyst needs to indicate domains of IDP and
SP (for example, in BrowserID case, persona.org and myfavoritebeer.org, respec-
tively). For the standalone web sites, the analyst needs to indicate the domains of the tested
sites. In both cases, the public keys of the participants need to be provided if HTTPS is used
in the implementation.
 Oracle. e analyst needs to provide an indication to represent the successful authenti-
cation. In our experiments, we provide unique strings on the response webpage from the
server such as "welcome user" to identify if the authentication succeeds.
 Cryptographic functions. Wemanually annotate the cryptographic functions in the Crypto
library of Node.js [16], for AS to identify the cryptographic functions. We also
annotate the functions in Mozilla jwcrypto [30], which is used in the implementation
of BrowserID. AS automatically infers cryptographic operations using its default
method in all other case studies.
For all cases, AS checks the authentication of the protocol and secrecy of the terms
used for authentication (such as the assertion in BrowserID, which is discussed later in this sec-
tion). ese properties are checked against the network attacker as well as the web attacker.
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Replay Attack in BrowserID. In two tested implementations of BrowserID, which use the
persona.org as IDP, AS identiĕes and generates a conĕrmed replay attack in the net-
work attacker model. AS generates an attack HTTP trace in which a malicious user logs
into the SP by replaying the token named assertion (message (7) in Figure B.2), without providing
login credentials to the IDP.e Ęaw leading to this attack is that the assertion is sent through an
insecure channel (HTTP) and it does not contain any session-speciĕc nonce. We have proposed
to add a nonce in the signature to solve this problem and notiĕed Mozilla about our ĕnding.
Mozilla acknowledged the security Ęaw.
CSRF Attack in BrowserID. AS identiĕes and conĕrms a replay attack in the web at-
tacker model. AS reports this attack on two of the BrowserID implementations, other
than the one from developer.mozilla.org. We have responsibly notiĕed the vendors of these
vulnerable implementations. Aer manual analysis of the inferred protocols, we ĕnd one crucial
diﬀerence between the vulnerable implementations from the developer.mozilla.org imple-
mentation. In the latter, SP client sends two anti-CSRF tokens (csrfmiddlewaretoken and
next which are inferred as nonces) in step 7 (Figure B.2), but these are absent from the protocol
schema of the vulnerable SPs implementation, permitting a CSRF attack. AS reports that
a malicious web site can send an HTTP POST request to the vulnerable SPs, which do not check
the Referrer ĕelds. Using this knowledge, we cra a script which can be used by the attacker to
modify the content on the web pages without Alice's approval.
Secret Token Leak in Facebook Connect. By following a similar procedure as illustrated in the
case of BrowserID, AS ĕnds one conĕrmed Ęaw in the implementation of FacebookCon-
nect, and another one in the usage of Facebook Connect by one out of the two SPs we tested. Both
attacks leak secret tokens in the network attacker model. In this case, we report that automatic
fuzzing was initially diﬃcult because Facebook blocks login failure for a test username/password
aer 10 attempts. For this, we manually skipped fuzzing the initial login request to the IDP, but
tested the remaining protocol with the SPs.
In the implementation of Facebook Connect, most of the communications are through
HTTPS to prevent network attackers from stealing the authorization tokens. However, A-
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S reports that the message at step 4 of Figure B.2-(b) is readable to the network attackers
because they are transmitted through a non-HTTPS channel, so two credentials c_user and xs
can be obtained by the attacker. us, the protocol is subject to a replay attack similar to the one
in BrowserID. Aer our experiments, we discover that a similar attack against the previous ver-
sion of Facebook Connect has been reported by Miculan et al. recently [158]. We conducted our
tests in the end of April 2012; Facebook ĕxed this Ęaw in early May 2012 before we were able to
notify them. In Facebook's latest implementation6, the communication in this step is protected
with HTTPS. AS ĕnds the other Ęaw leading to replay attack when an SP called Ebay-
Classiĕeds uses the Facebook Connect. Aer completing the Facebook Connect, the SP sends
the user credentials which can be used to fetch session cookies. However, these credentials are
also sent through a non-HTTPS channel.
Non-secret Token in Using Windows Live ID. We tested AS on the authentication
mechanism of Sina Weibo, a web site with more than 300 million users. It employs the Win-
dows Live ID to authenticate users. In this experiment, AS initially reported a security
warning claiming that a long-lived token (non-nonce value) is used to authenticate the user. We
subsequently manually investigated this warning, and found that the long-lived token (named
msn cid) reported by AS is known publicly. For example, it can be obtained from var-
ious sources such as straight from the MSN user proĕle page (https://profile.live.com/
cid-xxxx). When we added this token to the attacker's knowledge set and re-ran the experi-
ment, AS was able to automatically generate an attack trace.
is Ęow occurs aer a user completes the authentication with Windows Live ID, which
demonstrates that AS is useful for ĕnding simple, but severe logic Ęaws beyond the ini-
tial SSO authentication token exchange. Note that manually ĕnding these attacks is not easy;
AS eliminated 18 redundant cookies with diﬀerential fuzzing. e ĕnal HTTP packet
which is sent from user to Weibo web site for authentication, as constructed by AS, sets







is vulnerability impacts all Weibo users who have ever logged inWeibo throughWindows
Live Messenger. We have reported this security Ęaw to Sina Weibo. e security department of
Sina R&D has conĕrmed the exploit and posted us a gi for our contribution.
Guessable Token in Standalone Sites. AS detects one severe vulnerability in each of
the two standalone web sites: IyerMatrimony and MeetingMillionaries. Both of them have a
signiĕcant number of registered users, 220,000 and 1,275,000, respectively. e vulnerability
shows that both of these two web sites authenticate users by some guessable token. Exploiting
these vulnerabilities, the attacker can log into others' accounts and get full privilege of the victim
users.
In the case of IyerMatrimony, aer eliminating 7 redundant HTTP parameters with diﬀer-




rough diﬀerential fuzzing, AS ĕnds that sds and sdss keep constant among diﬀer-
ent accounts' multiple login sessions; for an individual account, the sde remains the same in its
multiple sessions. Among the test accounts, AS ĕnds that the 14-character preĕx of sde
remains constant and only the 2-character postĕx is incremented by one across accounts whose
IDs are consecutive numbers. AS conĕrms this Ęaw by predicting the value of sde for
our testing accounts and successfully logging into the account.
In theMeetingMillionaries case study, AS generates a security warning about a short-
length token used for authentication. Wemanually conĕrmed that this warning is a security Ęaw
and notiĕed the developers. In this site, a user can access his account information (including





AS ĕnds l,m and c are constant among diﬀerent users' sessions and r is associated with
the user account. s is the only credential but due to its short length (4 characters), AS
raises a warning of guessable token. Upon our manual investigation, we ĕnd that s is an alpha-
numeric string. We believe that automating attack generation for such tokens may be possible
in the future; we tested that AS can send about 500 requests to the server within one
minute. With such capability, it would take an enhanced implementation of AS at most
56 hours to guess the right s.
4.6.3 Eﬃciency & Running Time
Running Time. e total analysis time for most cases is less than 2 minutes, and can be as low as
5 seconds. e veriĕcation time for ProVerif is within 1 minute in our case studies. It shows that
the security-relevant parts of the protocols generated are usually small. We ĕnd that additional
source code results in the reduced number of iterations in our blackbox fuzzing step. For exam-
ple, in BrowserID, the client-side code is available, therefore, the number of fuzzing iterations is
smaller (20-30 rounds) than other SSO protocols (30-500 rounds as shown in the sixth column,
Table 4.2). Our data shows that AS's protocol extraction step is suﬃcient to ĕnd Ęaws
even when much of the protocol implementation is unavailable as shown in the Facebook case.
Redundant Data Reduction. When querying oﬀ-the-shelf veriĕcation tools like ProVerif, it is
important to remove redundant terms for better scalability. As shown in Table 4.2, AS
ĕnds that the majority of the messages (more than 80%) and HTTP parameters (more than 50%)
are irrelevant to the protocol and AS can successfully ĕlter them out. is shows that an
automatic tool is helpful in constructing the models from the complicated implementation de-
tails. Furthermore, this reduction helps greatly in reducing the veriĕcation time. For BrowserID,
ProVerif does not terminate within one hour if we naively retain all terms exchanged in the com-





Protocol Extraction. Works on automatically extracting models from the protocol implemen-
tations are most related to this work. Lie et al. [144] have proposed a method to automatically
extract speciĕcations from the protocol code. e model is extracted using program slicing and
veriĕed byMurphi tool. Aizatulin et al. [38] have proposedmodel extraction using symbolic exe-
cution. ese works extract the protocol speciĕcations from the source code, while our approach
does not assume to have the source code and provides blackbox fuzzing to infer the semantics
when the source code is not available.
SecurityAnalysis on SSOProtocols. Extensive research has been conducted tomanually analyze
security of SSO protocols. By reverse enginerrring the client implementations, Hanna et al. [116]
have revealed that some SSO protocols, including Facebook Connect and Google Friend Con-
nect, use the cross-domain communication channel--postMessage insecurely, E.Tsyrklevich
and V.Tsyrklevich [199] have demonstrated several attacks such as CSRF against the OpenID
protocol. Wang et al.'s work [207] have conducted a ĕeld study on the commercially deployed
web SSO systems and discovered 8 serious logic Ęaws in many notable IDPs and SPs. Xing et
al. [212] have attempt to protect integrators for their integration of third-party SSO Web ser-
vices.
Some formal analysis approaches also have been used to analyze the security of SSOprotocols.
Miculan and Urban [158] manually extract speciĕcation of Facebook Connect Protocol from the
HTTPmessages exchaged. eymodel the protocol inHLSPL and check it usingAVISPA. Bansal
et al. [56] use applied pi-calculus and ProVerif to analyze the OAuth 2.0 protocol. eir work
focuses on constructing concrete attacks from the attack trace reported by ProVerif, and building
the operational web attacker model library called WebSpi to map the attack trace to web-site
actions. Sun et al. [196] alsomodel the web attacker precisely. Sun et al.manually extract OpenID
2.0 implementation inHLPSL and verify themodel usingAVISPA and foundCSRF attacks. ere
are also other formal analysis approaches on SSO protocol. Most of them model the protocol
manually based on the protocol documentation or speciĕcation, and take into consideration only
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the network attack model. For example, there have been several formal analysis approaches on
SAML SSO protocols [107, 117, 42]. In contrast to these work, AS looks at the security
Ęaws in the implementations.
4.8 Summary
In this work, we present AS, an end-to-end platform to automatically recover authenti-
cation protocol speciĕcations from their implementations. AS has successfully detected
7 security vulnerabilities in real-world applications automatically. Our techniques assume no
knowledge of the protocol speciĕcations being checked and rely on a small set of practical as-
sumptions.
AS proves that the analyzable speciĕcation can be extracted from real-world imple-
mentations. However, due to the semantic gap between the implementation and the high-level
modeling languages, some security-critical information may be missed during the course of ex-
traction. e extracted models are seldom equivalent to the implementations which the security
eventually relies on. erefore, we aggressively make an attempt of applying formal methods
directly on the implementations, which is presented in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Veriĕcation of Android Applications
against Security Properties Using
Targeted Soware Model Checking
5.1 Introduction
Nowadays, numerous readily accessible Android apps with feature-rich functionalities have been
extensively used in security-sensitive scenarios. For example, mobile users (simply users here-
aer) heavily rely on them to handle personal data (e.g., contacts, ĕnancial data and geographic
location) and consumepremium services (e.g., online banking, online shopping and sending SMS
messages). Moreover, Android apps are playing an increasingly important role in enterprise, gov-
ernment and military bureaus. For example, it has been reported recently that the US military
is developing an app to enable drone control via Android phones [183]. Nevertheless, various
security issues of Android apps are continuously being discovered and discussed, ranging from
sensitive data leakage [220, 221, 104], to privilege escalation [150, 177, 70]. To enjoy the bene-
ĕt of apps while preserving security, verifying them ahead of releasing and installation becomes
imperative by market operators and users.
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Most of the prior studies rely on static analysis and dynamic testing for security analysis, for
instance, detecting sensitive data leakage [180, 44, 100, 99] and analyzing capability leakage [150,
103]. However, these approaches have their limitations. Static analysis may generate false alarms
due to its inherent limitations in capturing runtime context (e.g., actual parameters and index of
arrays) and tackling late-binding programming paradigms such as polymorphism and reĘection.
For instance, points-to analysis (which yields an over-approximation) is oen used so that all
potential violations are identiĕed. While having all potential violations reported and ĕxed might
be desirable for high-assurance government and military scenarios [97], it is nevertheless too
restrictive for common usage. In contrary, dynamic testing only executes selected program paths
and thus can precisely identify property violations [47, 119], but never proves their absence.
In this work, we seek a practical and credible approach for verifying Android apps against se-
curity properties. A potentially promising technique for solving this problem is soware model
checking [204, 55], which proposes an automatic way to verify properties of a ĕnite-state system.
e advantages of sowaremodel checking, compared with the abovementioned approaches, in-
clude that it does not generate false alarms if the model checker (e.g., Java Pathĕnder (JPF) [204]
for Java programs) actually executes the program under investigation and that it is capable of
proving the absence of violations with an exhaustive search. Inspired by soware model check-
ing, we started an eﬀort to build an Android model checker named DPF upon JPF.e core
technique of soware model checking we use in this work is the dynamic state-space exploration
which runs through the possible executions of an app. In the exploration engine, we also im-
plement a taint-style system to track sensitive information Ęow for privacy property checking,
and additional reachability checking for the privilege properties (e.g., blocking incoming SMS
messages).
Using the state-of-the-art model checker JPF allows us to enjoy well-developed techniques of
JPF (e.g., partial order reduction), as well as the various evolving features from JPF's active devel-
oper community (e.g., eﬃcient exploration [115, 88]). Nonetheless, the challenge when we apply
JPF to verify Android apps is at least threefold. First, unlike ordinary Java programs, Android
apps are tightly coupled with the Android OS which consists of a set of libraries containing both
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Java and native code, and complex inter-process communications. Although written in Java, the
apps are compiled to bytecode that only runs on the Dalvik virtual machine instead of the tradi-
tional Java virtual machine (JVM). erefore, it is hard for JPF to execute apps without using a
real device or an emulator, not to mention storing and recovering program states. Second, due
to the asynchronicity and event-driven execution paradigm, an app can have many entry points,
whereas JPF allows only one entry at a time. One way to solve this problem is to construct a
driver program that enumerates all possible event permutations, which would then activate all
possible paths within the app. However, this approach could lead to false positives because some
of the paths may never appear in practice. ird, same as the traditional model checking, there
exists the infamous state space explosion problem. erefore, verifying real-world apps calls for
eﬀective reduction techniques.
In order to tackle the ĕrst challenge, DPF includes an extensible mock-up Android OS
that abstracts the Android OS using ordinary Java programs so that analysis techniques/tools
developed for ordinary Java can be employed. ere are techniques available to automatically
generate mock-ups of the environment [198, 76], but since the dependencies within the environ-
ment are complex, these techniques are not mature enough [200]. us, we create the mock-ups
manually, which is the same approach used by other tools that require a mock-up of their en-
vironment for model-checking purposes [204, 156, 201]. Although mocking up an entire OS
manually is a major eﬀort, it is a one-time eﬀort and DPF has supported a range of func-
tionalities of Android OS which allows us to verify a number of real-world apps. Furthermore,
DPF provides an extensible framework so that we can incrementally develop the mock-up.
In order to tackle the second challenge, we develop a technique called dependency-constrained
event permutation. is technique reduces the event permutations by excluding impossible event
sequences based on the dependency among the events (e details of this technique is introduced
in Section 5.6.1).
Lastly, in order to cope with the problem of state-space explosion, DPF uses a new tech-
nique called targeted model checking, which combines the virtue of both static and dynamic
















Figure 5.1: High-level Overview of Our Approach
and then model check (i.e., dynamically explore) only the remaining parts of the app. Figure 5.1
shows the high-level work Ęow of our approach, which consists of two stages. First, we obtain an
over-approximation of all program paths which might lead to property violations. e approxi-
mation is then used to reduce the program by removing the safe parts of the app. Aerward, we
model check the reduced app against the property. As a result, the eﬃcient but imprecise static
analysis dramatically reduces the state space, which enhances the scalability of our approach,
whereas the precise dynamic exploration pinpoints the actual violations of the properties.
To summarize, our main contributions are threefold. First, we propose DPF, a veri-
ĕcation framework which employs the state-of-the-art soware model checking techniques to
Android apps. It enables JPF-based dynamic state-space exploration, by including an extensible
mock-up Android OS that provides the major OS functionalities. Second, we propose targeted
model checking and dependency-constrained event permutation for state space reduction. ird,
to the best of our knowledge, DPF is the ĕrst attempt to apply soware model checking to
verify security properties of Android apps.
We acknowledge that the eﬀectiveness of DPF is limited by not only the underlying JPF
engine, but also the correctness and completeness of the mock-up OS. However, verifying the
equivalence of the mock-up and the Android OS, or the correctness of the mock-up is a far more
challenging task, and therefore is not discussed within the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, we
empirically show that DPF not only can ĕnd bugs eﬀectively but also verify apps in a number
of cases. We evaluate DPF using three sets (a total of 70) of apps: four real-world apps down-
loaded from Google Play and alternative app markets, four known malware samples from recent
research [220] and the DroidBench [44] which itself is a comprehensive benchmark (including
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62 apps) built to evaluate information leakage analysis. DPF detects nearly all (except those
with implicit information Ęow) of the known security issues from the malware samples, a previ-
ously unknown data leakage from a third-party library embedded by benign apps, a use-aer-free
bug from the benchmark, and two soware bugs leading to app crash. We compare DPF
with state-of-the-art veriĕcation tools in terms of precision. Our experiments demonstrate that
DPF has low false negative rate and zero false positives.
5.2 Background
In the following, we present an overview of the Android framework and exemplify the diﬃculties
in verifying Android apps.
5.2.1 Overview of Android
Android apps consist of four types of app components: activity, service, content provider and
broadcast receiver. An activity implements the foreground logic, such as Graphical User Inter-
face (GUI); a service runs in the background; a content provider is devoted to data management,
which can use ĕles, SQLite databases or the web as its back-end persistent storage, and a broad-
cast receiver handles the broadcasts sent by the OS and other components. e app components
interact through inter-component communication (or ICC), and the exchanged messages are
called intents. e components included in an app can be either statically deĕned in itsmanifest
ĕle (AndroidManifest.xml) or dynamically created at runtime.
Unlike a traditional Java programwith a mainmethod as its only entry point, Android adopts
an event-driven execution mechanism, where an app implements a set of callbacks as event han-
dlers (which can be registered/unregistered either statically or dynamically). Whenever a par-
ticular event occurs (e.g., launching an app and clicking a button), the Android OS invokes the
corresponding callback methods. erefore, an app usually has multiple entry points and event
handlers (entry points and event handlers are used interchangeably). e events can be catego-
rized into three types.
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 Lifecycle Events. A component's lifecycle consists of multiple stages. As the user launches,
pauses and resumes an app, its components of the app change their stages accordingly.
When a component enters a new stage, the corresponding callback that is pre-implemented
by the app is invoked by the OS. For instance, an activity has multiple stages such as
launched, running, paused and stopped. When the user clicks the app's launcher icon,
the activity enters the launched stage. Accordingly, theOS ĕrst callsmethod onCreate()
and aerwards onStart().
 GUI Events. GUI events occur when the user interacts with the apps, which include two
types: data inputs from the user and actions taken by the user.
 ICC Events. e ICC events are mostly used for communication among apps. Besides,
when some particular events occur, the OS broadcasts a message or directly invokes the
callback methods implemented by the app. For example, when there is an incoming
SMS message, the OS broadcasts an intent to notify the apps. As another example, when
the system is running low on memory, the OS invokes onLowMemory() which is pre-
implemented by the apps.
5.2.2 An Example
In the following, we present a simple app and illustrate the challenges in verifying Android apps.
Figure 5.2 shows a made-up app which combines features of three apps in the DroidBench [44].
In this app, there exists a path through which the IMEI of the device is leaked, which is com-
monly seen in real-world malware samples [220]. Although we show source code in this section,
DPF directly works with the bytecode of the apps.
is app contains three components, i.e., two activity components MotivatingAct and
DummyAct, and a content provider component CProvider. e code of DummyAct and
CProvider is omitted in the ĕgure to save space. DummyAct does nothing but just displays an
empty canvas. Besides, two buttons are deĕned in the MotivatingAct's xml layout ĕle and their
click handlers are set as leak and noleak, respectively (Figure 5.3). When MotivatingAct is
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1 public class MotivatingAct extends Activity {
2 private String[10] array;
3 private com.droidpf.CProvider cp;
4 private String url = "content://com.droidpf.cp/test1";
5 protected void onCreate(Bundle b) {
6 setContentView(R.layout.DroidPF);
7 cp = new com.test.sqlite.CProvider();
8 }
9 protected void onStart(){
10 TelephonyManager mgr = (TelephonyManager) this.getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
11 String imei = mgr.getDeviceId(); //source
12 ContentValues values = new ContentValues();
13 values.put("theid", 10000);
14 values.put("thename", imei);
15 cp.insert(Uri.parse(url), values); //sink
16 }
17 protected void onRestart(){
18 Cursor cursor = cp.query(Uri.parse(url), null, null, null, null); //source
19 cursor.moveToFirst();
20 array[5] = cursor.getString(1);
21 array[4] = "no privacy";
22 }
23 /*leak() and noleak() are the callback functions of the buttons defined in MotivatingApp/layout/
DroidPF.xml*/
24 public void leak(View view){
25 SmsManager smsmanager=SmsManager.getDefault();
26 smsmanager.sendTextMessage("1234", null, array[indexLeak()], null, null); //sink
27 }
28 public void noleak(View view){
29 Intent intent = new Intent(this, DummyAct.class);
30 startActivity(intent); //sink
31 }
32 private int indexLeak(){
33 int index = Calendar.getInstance().get(Calendar.MONTH);
34 index = index/13; //index becomes 0
35 index += 5; // alternatively, index += 4;
36 return index;
37 }
38 private void onStop(){
39 ... // do nothing
40 }
41 }
Figure 5.2: Activity Component of the Illustrative App
started, it reads the IMEI by invoking getDeviceID() (line 11) and stores it in the database
maintained by CProvider (line 15). When MotivatingAct is restarted (onRestart() is in-
voked), the IMEI is read from CProvider (line 18-20). Aer that, once button1 is clicked, the
IMEI is sent to a particular phone number through an SMS message (line 26).
is example demonstrates several technical challenges that may lead to imprecision in app
veriĕcation.
 Dependency on the OS.e apps heavily depend on the Android OS---even a small app
contains multiple Android API calls. ese API calls are relevant to the app's behaviors
such as the event handlers, and thus cannot be simply ignored during the analysis. For
83
5.3. OVERVIEW OF OUR APPROACH
1 <Button android:id="@+id/button1" android:text="@string/send" android:onClick="leak" />
2 <Button android:id="@+id/button2" android:text="@string/start dummy" android:onClick="noleak" />
Figure 5.3: Part of the xml Layout File
instance, if an analyzer does not examine the logic in setContentView (where the xml
layout in Figure 5.3 is registered), the binding between the button and the click handler
would be missed. As a result, the data leakage would not be detected because it is activated
by the onClick handler. An intuitive remedy would be to analyze the part of the OS which
becomes relevant given an API call. However, due to the complexity of the OS, even a
simple API call would imply that a big portion of the OS must be analyzed.
 Asynchronous Event Occurrences. Events in Android may asynchronously occur non-
deterministically, which may be relevant to the app's behavior. For example, the sequence
onRestart!onClick is safe but onStart!onRestart!onClick causes a leakage.
 Obfuscation. To obstruct malware detection, malware developers may employ obfusca-
tion techniques [181, 128]. e example shows a simple obfuscation. Line 26 invokes
sendTextMessage to send an SMS message. To decide whether this call leaks sensitive
information (i.e., the IMEI), the actual values of the parameters have to be examined. How-
ever, line 33-36 make it diﬃcult to statically determine the value of index, imprecision
would be introduced into the approaches based on static analysis.
5.3 Overview of Our Approach
In this section, we deĕne the problem of app veriĕcation and present an overview on how
DPF solves the problem.
5.3.1 eModel
According to our study of the vulnerabilities impacting Android which are listed in CVE [6],
most (86.8% of 387) security threats on the Android platform reside in the apps. erefore, we
focus on application-level threats in this work (and exclude those in the OS) and verify one app
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(e numbers before the instructions/variables stands for the line numbers in Figure 5.2; CP stands for a valid instance of the
content provider; the emphasized path (in bold) shows the shortest path leading to a violation of privacy property.)
Figure 5.4: Partial State Space of the Running Example
at a time. In order to model check an app, we formalize its behaviors as a labeled transition
system (LTS) Lapp = (S; init;; T ran), where S is the set of states, init 2 S is an initial state,
 is an alphabet, and Tran  S   S is the set of labeled transition relations.
States. e state that we consider includes the program state of an app. e program state is the
same as the state in JPF, which is a snapshot of the execution status. It consists of the status of the
heap (e.g., the values of the program variables), threads states and the program counter. We refer
the readers to [204] for details on how program states are represented and compared in JPF.
Transitions. A transition is a state change by executing an atomic sequence of instructions (i.e.,
a block). We assume that the transition label is a string presentation of the instructions. For
instance, if the transition is triggered by a method call Button2.onClick(), the label is simply
Button2.onClick().
Given the above LTS interpretation of an app, we then deĕne relevant terms in the standard
way. For instance, the execution of an app is formalized as runs, which are sequences of alter-
nating states and blocks  = hs0; b0; s1; b1; :::i; a slice  = hb0; b1; b2; :::i is a sequence of blocks
occurring in a run; and a state sn is reachable if there exists a run  such that s0 = init and
(si; bi; si+1) 2 Tran for all i < n. Furthermore, given a property (for model checking), the
truth value of the property is deĕned based on the above-deĕned LTS in the standard way.
Figure 5.4 shows partly the state space of our running example. Each state contains the pro-
gram state, i.e., values of the global variables (other information such as the program counter is
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not shown), and the system state, i.e., status of the database. At each state, there are multiple
choices for diﬀerent behaviors. e diﬀerent choices correspond to diﬀerent thread schedul-
ing and diﬀerent events. In order to systematically explore all the states, we need an environ-
ment which systematically generates not only all diﬀerent scheduling and but also all events. e
former is solved by relying on JPF, which implements a backtrackable JVM that provides non-
deterministic choices and control over thread scheduling. e latter (speciĕc to the event-driven
nature of Android apps) is solved by constructing driver programs which generates all relevant
event sequences (detailed in Section 5.6). Figure 5.4 also suggests that the state spacemay quickly
grow if no reduction/abstraction is performed.
5.3.2 e Property
DPF focuses on checking the so-called privilege properties and privacy properties, which,
according to the research of Android Malware Genome Project [220], are the main concerns
of app veriĕcation. A privilege property is related to the use of the sensitive permissions, e.g.,
stealthily sending SMS messages, installing/uninstalling apps, deleting contacts and blocking in-
coming SMSmessages. A privilege property is violated if there is a ĕnite path inLapp which leads
to an invocation of the high-privileged APIs. is property can be checked through reachability
checking, i.e., whether a state where a high-priviledged API is invoked is reachable or not.
A privacy property is related to the actions of disclosing the private information, e.g., IMEI,
GPS location and contacts. Privacy properties are oen checked with the so-called taint analy-
sis [44, 95]. A private property is violated if there is a ĕnite path inLapp fromaprivate information
source (e.g., contacts) to an information sink (e.g., the invocation of messaging sending API), and
furthermore, the data at the sink must be tainted by the data at the source, i.e., there is a data de-
pendency between them. To model check privacy properties, DPF introduces an auxiliary
Boolean variables tainted (for each data variable in the app) whose truth value tells whether a
state in Lapp is tainted. Initially, tainted is false. For each transition (s1; b; s2) in Lapp, tainted
is true at s2 if and only if b is an information source, or there is a data-dependency between the
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data variable at s2 to a tainted variable at s1. As a result, checking private property is eﬀectively
reduced to reachability analysis, i.e., whether a sink is reachable with tainted being true.
By focusing on the above-mentioned properties, DPF is eﬀectively designed to copewith
the following attacker model. at is, the adversary is able to develop and release malicious apps,
or embed his malicious bytecode into benign apps. e adversary can also use advanced ob-
fuscation techniques, e.g., complicating code Ęow, inserting extraneous code blocks and using
reĘection.
5.3.3 eModel Checking
Based on the above discussion, the problem of verifying anAndroid app is reduced to reachability
analysis and thus can be solved using model checkers like JPF. In the following, we brieĘy intro-
duce how JPFworks. In order to systematically enumerate all states, at a programpoint where two
or more choices become possible, e.g., scheduling points, human interaction and random system
events, JPF records the current state and executes all choices separately, i.e., aer completing one
choice, it backtracks to the previous point and restores the state. In order to check whether a
target state (i.e., a state at which the property is violated) is reached, DPF uses the call-back
mechanism provided in JPF (i.e., by introducing listeners). For privilege properties, DPF
listens on the methodEntered callback to check if over-privileged APIs are invoked1. Checking
privacy properties is slightly more complicated. First, DPF listens on the methodExited
callback to detect the invocations to the information sources and then labels the return values of
those calls as tainted. Second, it listens on the instructionExecuted callback to track the taint
Ęow. ird, it listens on the methodEntered to check whether the parameters of the invocations
to the sinks contain tainted values. In order to precisely track the data Ęowing through the com-
posite data types, we adopt a ĕne-grained taint tracking. When sensitive data are transmitted
into a ĕeld of an object, DPF taints the speciĕc ĕeld instead of the whole object.
However, as discussed previously, there are three challenges that we need to solve before JPF
1To minimize false positives, we use context to determine whether a behavior is initiated by the user, similar to
prior research [78, 217].
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can be applied. In the following, we present an overview of how DPF solves the challenges
and leave the details in the following sections. e high-level workĘow of DPF is shown
in Figure 5.1. Firstly, given a privilege property or privacy property, DPF performs a static
analysis (i.e., program slicing) to identify all potential program paths which would lead to prop-
erty violation. For instance,in Figure 5.4, the state space contains some parts which are obviously
irrelevant, such as the state space of DummyAct, which can be identiĕed statically. Once the irrel-
evant parts are identiĕed, DPF modiĕes the app accordingly so that the irrelevant parts are
pruned and thus avoided during dynamic exploration later. e details of this step is presented
in Section 5.4. Secondly, DPF provides a mock-up of the Android OS so that JPF can dy-
namically execute the app. e details on how the mock-up OS in DPF is constructed is in
Section 5.5. Lastly, DPF incrementally constructs a driver program which would drive the
explosion of the app using JPF. On this step, we exclude the event sequences that are infeasible in
reality, e.g., onStart! onCreate in the app shown in Figure 5.4. Notice that these infeasible
event sequences cannot be reduced by those general reduction techniques used in JPF.e details
on how the driver program is constructed is presented in Section 5.6.
5.4 Static App Reduction
e goal is to statically prune part of the app which is irrelevant to a given property. Recall that
the problem of verifying a privilege property or a privacy property is reduced to the problem of
checkingwhether any bad state is reachable or not. Intuitively, static reduction inDPFworks
by ĕrstly over-approximating the set of bad states and then using backward program slicing to
identify all potential program paths which would lead to any bad state. Since program slicing is
a relatively mature technique (see [124] for details), in the following we focus on how DPF
over-approximates the set of bad paths and how DPF makes sure all relevant program paths
are included. e slicing implemented in DPF is based a static slicing analysis framework
called SAAF [124].
Given an app, the potential bad states include the following.
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Button btn = new Button(this);
btn.setText("send");
btn.setOnClickListener(new View.OnclickLister(){




Figure 5.5: Dynamic Event Handler Registration
 Taint Sinks. Reaching a taint sink (e.g., an invocation of the system function to send an
SMS) would potentially violate a privacy property and thus all taint sinks are included.
In addition, we include taint sources in the set of bad states so that we can tell whether a
path reaching a sink goes through a source. Identifying all sources and sinks has been well
researched in the literature [124, 44, 179] and thus DPF simply uses those deĕned in
SAAF, which include ĕle/network/database I/O APIs (e.g., line 15&18 in Figure 5.2) and
ICC APIs (e.g., line 30).
 High-privileged APIs. All invocations of high-privileged APIs (e.g., abortBroadcast()
which may block incoming SMS) are included since reaching themmay violate a privilege
property.
 APIs for ReĘection. Since the exact class/method/ĕeld accessed through reĘection is hard
to decide statically, reaching anAPI for reĘection, such asjava.lang.reflect.Method.
invoke(), might lead to violation of the property and thus they are included.
 APIs for Dynamic Registration. Android allows an app to register components and event
handlers both statically and dynamically. For example, Figure 5.3 shows how to register
the button and its onClick listener statically through a layout ĕle. Equivalently, the code
snippet in Figure 5.5 registers a button at runtime. Due to this Ęexibility, it is hard to
predicate statically whether the dynamic registration would lead to a property violation
and thus they are included.
We remark that the given propertymay be violated only if a bad state, as deĕned above, is reached
through a path in the app. us, next the set of bad states are used as slicing criteria so that
program slicing techniques are used to identify all paths in the appwhichwould lead to a bad state.
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In particular, DPF starts the backward slicing from each bad state in the set. It tracks both
intra- and inter-component data and Ęow dependency. For intra-component backward slicing,
DPF searches for use-def chains and call chains. e former captures data Ęow relationswhile
the latter captures call relations. First, based on the use-def chains, DPF identiĕes 1) all of
the registers and ĕelds that have data dependency with the criteria, and 2) all of the methods (we
call them relevant methods) in which the depended data are modiĕed. For instance, tracking
the parameter array in line 26 of Figure 5.2 leads to identiĕcation of the method onRestart.
Second, based on the call chains, DPF identiĕes the program slices which start from an event
handler and lead to the invocation of any relevant method.
e more precise the slicing is, the more we can prune statically from the app. Nonetheless,
because DPF relies on dynamic execution aerwards to ĕnd actual problems, we can aﬀord
to over-approximate (without worrying about false alarms) when a precise points-to analysis is
expensive. In particular, the following strategies are adopted in DPF for eﬃciency. First,
once an element of an array/string becomes relevant, the array/string becomes relevant. Second,
once a ĕeld of an object becomes relevant, thewhole object becomes relevant. ird, for polymor-
phism and overriding, whenever we cannot decide precisely, all methods with the same signature
are included.
DPF tracks inter-component Ęow as well. Aer identifying relevant methods within
components, the next step is to collect the relevant components. e approach is to over-
approximate the receivers of each ICC. Although it is sometimes feasible to statically identify
the exact receivers of each ICC (e.g., using the approach in [170] which requires string analysis),
for the same reason above, we (soundly) approximate the ICC by treating all the components
which send/receive intents to be relevant.
We extract the components and event handlers from the slices and only execute them in the
dynamic exploration step. e irrelevant parts are replaced with noops so that they are skipped
by JPF. Taking the running example for instance, aer static reduction, the paths starting from
onStop and the state space of DummyAct can be excluded. Based on the above discussion, the
following is established.
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Proposition 5.4.1 None of the potential property violating behaviors is reduced during the reduc-
tion.
5.5 Mocking Up Android OS
In this section, we address the challenge of executing Android apps in a traditional JVM, which
is necessary for JPF. A straightforward way might be to use an Android emulator as a stub and
interact with DPF through JPF's native peer mechanism. However, DPF would not be
able to track the execution in the stub since from its perspective, the stub is a black box. As a
result, the logic in the OS which might be relevant to the checked property would be lost. One
such example, in the content provider (CProvider) of our running example, is the sensitive data
Ęow through the database ĕle. Without tracking the behaviors of the OS, the data Ęow would
become untraceable for DPF.
DPF's solution is to develop a set of mock-ups of OS functionalities in Java. e main
challenge of OS abstraction is to balance scalability and correctness. For instance, while it might
be feasible to mock-up all native code in the Android OS, it may not be easy to ensure that the
mock-up is correct, due to lack of speciĕcation of the native code. Rather, we choose to de-
velop the mock-up at such a level that the semantics relevant to the property is easy to under-
stand. For instance, instead of mocking up only the native code in the database component in
Android (which contains both naive code and Java code), we mock up the entire database com-
ponent instead (by implementing a HashMap essentially). In addition, instead of building the
mock-up OS from scratch, we reuse the source code of the Android OS as much as possible.
Table 5.1 lists the main modules of the Android OS that we have mocked up. DPF in-
tercepts the invocations to the native code and mocks-up their expected behavior in Java. Some
mock-ups are straightforward. For example, the resource managers (e.g., location manager and
SMS manager), can be substituted with dummy ones which simply return faked values without
invoking the real managers in native code. Some are rather complicated, including the GUI and
the I/O management. We have thus devoted most of our eﬀorts to those.
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Table 5.1: Main Modules Modiĕed in DPF
Types Modules
Compo- android.app.(ActivityjServicejContextImpljDialog), android.content.











I/O java.io.*, android.database.sqlite.*, android.content.SharedPreferences
GUI. GUI relies on enormous native code to render images and handle the user's interaction.
Its events include action events (e.g., clicking a button) and data inputs (for example, typing texts
through a TextEdit). DPFmocks them up in diﬀerent ways. For an action event, it directly
invokes the event handler from the drivers. For the data inputs, DPF relies on the analyst
to conĕgure the range of the input values with a choice generator for high precision. Since most
of the GUI events are related to the actions in the mobile application domain, we consider this
approach practical.
I/O Management. As shown in the running example, the sensitive information can Ęow
through the database and ĕles, which may become untraceable. To address this challenge, we
simulate the database and ĕles I/O with in-memory data structures. When the app performs a
write operation to store a data item into an external ĕle, the item is written into an in-memory
buﬀer (under control of DPF). Similarly, ĕle-based SQL databases are simulated using in-
memory tables. With the interception and proper implementation of a set of I/O APIs, such as
read, cursor, uri and SQLiteOpenHelper, the mock-up I/O is completely transparent to the
apps.
Limitation. Mocking up the Android OS indeed requires a lot of engineering eﬀort, as we have
experienced. However, this step is a one-time eﬀort and as far as as we can tell, this is the only way
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to verify apps. Having said that, mocking up the whole OS before analyzing any app is perhaps
not smart. us, in our work, besides mocking up common used components like GUI and I/O
management, we always start with static app reduction and then focus on mocking up only the
revelent components, which based on our experience, are oen much reduced.
5.6 Driver Generation
e goal of driver generation is to construct a driver program which allows JPF to systematically
explore all states in the app. Furthermore, in order to tackle the state-space explosion problem,
DPF is designed to generated only feasible event sequences relevant to the app.
5.6.1 Dependency-constrained Event Permutation
One challenge for the driver generation is that events can occur asynchronously. An intuitive
but costly strategy is to enumerate all of the permutations of the events, which guarantees com-
pleteness but deĕnitely generates invalid sequences and leads to the notorious path explosion
problem. erefore, we introduce a dependency-constrained event permutation, which exploits
the dependency relations among the events to prune the exploration paths.
We use deterministic ĕnite automata (DFA) to specify the dependency relations among the
events. An event sequence is valid if and only if it is accepted by the DFA. A DFA is a 5-tuple:
(Q;;; q0; Sa), where Q is a ĕnite set of states;  is a ĕnite set of events (alphabet);  is the
transition set; q0 is the start state and Sa is the set of ĕnal/accepting state.
We start with deĕning a full lifecycle DFA (L-DFA) for each of the four types of app compo-
nents, which is built based on the oﬃcial documentations of Android [18]. e alphabet of the
full L-DFA includes all of the lifecycle event handlers. As an example, Figure 5.6 shows the full
L-DFA of the activity component.
Most of the time, not all of the lifecycle events are relevant to the checked properties. ere-
fore, at the second step, DPF projects the full L-DFAwith respect to the app's alphabet using
algorithm 3. We call the obtained DFA a concrete L-DFA. Aer obtaining the concrete L-DFA,
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q0: start state; q1: activity is launched; q2: activity is restoring saved state; q3: saved state is restored; q4:
activity is becoming visible; q5: activity is resuming; q6: activity is active in the foreground; q7: activity is
ĕnishing; q8: activity is not visible; q9: system is saving activity state; q10: activity is being destroyed by the
system. onSave stands for onSaveInstanceState and onRestore for onRestoreInstanceState






Figure 5.7: DFA of MotivatingAct in Figure 5.2
DPF extends it to incorporate those relevant GUI and ICC events identiĕed in static reduc-
tion. Our key insight is an invariant that an activity only handles GUI events and ICC events
when it is in active state (q6 in Figure 5.6). erefore, we add the permutations of these events to
the active state (availability of a GUI item is checked before invoking its handlers, which ensures
that it is not disabled). As an example, Figure 5.7 shows the ĕnal DFA specifying the dependency
relations of events in MotivatingAct.
Based on the DFA, DPF generates legitimate event sequences. e number of the se-
quences may be inĕnite due to the loops in the DFA (e.g., q01q02q01 in Figure 5.7). However, we do
not have to restrict the number of loops as the state space exploration would terminate when all
states (not event sequences) are explored.
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Algorithm 3 L-DFA Projection Algorithm
Input: dfa full L-DFA, EvntSet lifecycle event set
Output: cdfa concrete L-DFA
1: for all t = qi e ! qj in dfa: do
2: if e /2 EvntSet then
3: qi  combine(qi; qj)
4: dfa:Q dfa:Q  qj ;
5: dfa: dfa:  t
6: for all t0 = qj e
0 ! qk do
7: dfa: dfa: [ fqi e
0 ! qkg
8: end for
9: for all t0 = qk
e0 ! qj do






15: return dfa ;
5.6.2 Driver Generation Algorithm
Overview. Given the relevant components and events, DPF creates an initial driver which
only includes a set of relevant lifecycle event sequences of the app's main activity component (i.e.,
the ĕrst component invoked when the user launches the app). By dynamically executing the
created driver, DPF is able to reach more relevant components and events. When a rele-
vant event is reached, DPF constructs new event sequences which are accepted by the DFA,
and generates new drivers to drive the next-round execution. When a relevant component is
reached, DPF includes its lifecycle event sequences. By iteratively executing each of the
drivers, DPF gradually expands the driver set until nomore relevant components and events
can be reached (meaning a complete set of drivers are generated).
Example. We take our running example (Figure 5.2) for instance to show the generation process.
Initially, DPF generates a driver which only includes the three lifecycle events onCreate,
onStart and onRestart of MotivatingAct. It then dynamically executes the driver. When
executing the setContentView (line 6), it reaches two relevant buttons which are registered
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Algorithm 4Dynamic Exploration Algorithm
Input: App app, RCmpSet relevant components, REvntSet relevant events, ED dependency
DFA
Output: A driver set
1: EvntSet drvInit(App;RCmpSet;REvntSet; ED)
2: CmpSet EMPTY
3: DrvSet drvGen(EvntSet; CmpSet; ED)
4: DrvSetold  EMPTY
5: whileDrvSet 6= DrvSetold do
6: DrvSetold  DrvSet
7: for all drv inDrvSet do
8: (EvntSet; CmpSet) dynExplore(drv)
9: end for
10: (EvntSet; CmpSet) filter(EvntSet; CmpSet;RCmpSet;REvntSet)
11: DrvSet drvGen(EvntSet; CmpSet; ED)
12: end while
13: return (Init; ProSet);
in the layout xml ĕle. It thus includes the onClick events of the buttons into the new driver.
Later, it reaches the content provider CProvider which is dynamically registered in line 7. It
then includes the lifecycle events of CProvider and generates another driver which contains all
present components and events. When executing line 30, it parses the intent and identiĕes the
invoked component as DummyAct. Because DummyAct has been found irrelevant in the static
analysis step, DPF does not include it into the driver.
Algorithm. Algorithm 4 details our driver generation algorithm. e inputs of the algorithm
include the app, the relevant components/events and a DFA. e outputs of the algorithm are a
set of drivers. e algorithm consists of two steps: driver initialization (line 1-3) and expansion
process (line 4-10). e drvInitmethod (line 1) ĕrst identiĕes the main component by parsing
the app's AndroidManifest.xml ĕle. Aer obtaining the main component, DPF searches
its lifecycle event handlers from the relevant event set. e identiĕed events are taken as inputs
to the drvGen which permutates the events and generates a set of event sequences. Each of the
sequences (denoted by seq) is then used to generate a driver, which invokes the event handlers
in the order of seq.
In the expansion step (line 4-10), DPF expands the initial driver set. It starts from a
dynamic exploration (line 7-8). e dnyExplore method executes each of the drivers in the
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driver set DrvSet. During the execution, it identiĕes dynamically-registered components and
GUI elements.
 Components. DPF considers two types of registration: instantiation and invoca-
tion by ICC. First, once a component is instantiated dynamically, such as CProvider
in our running example (line 7, Figure 5.2), DPF adds it into CmpSet. Second,
when the program invokes a new component using ICC, such as startActivity() and
startService(), the invoked component is included.
 GUI Elements. For each GUI element that is registered dynamically, DPF adds its
event handlers into EvntSet.
Aer identifying new components and events, DPF only selects those relevant ones for
driver generation (line 9-10).
5.6.3 Correctness of Generated Drivers
Our driver generation algorithm preserves both soundness and completeness. Here soundness
means that all the event sequences generated can occur in the real-world execution, while com-
pleteness means all the sequences leading to property violations are included. Intuitively, the
soundness and completeness are based on proposition 5.4.1 and the following three rules.
Proposition 5.6.1 DFA-based sequence generation is sound and complete.
Proposition 5.6.2 e code executed by dynamic exploration is reachable in the real-world execu-
tion.
Proposition 5.6.3 Parsing manifest in drvInit (line 1) is able to precisely identify lifecycle events,
since they cannot be hidden or obfuscated by the adversary in order to be invoked by OS.
For soundness, initially, drvInit (line 1) is sound (rule 5.6.3) and the initial sequences gener-
ated in drvGen are sound (rule 5.6.1). In each iteration, expansion of relevant components
and events is sound (rule 5.6.2). For completeness, initially, drvInit (line 1) is able to iden-
tify all the relevant lifecycle callbacks (rule 5.6.3 and 5.4.1) and the initial sequence generation
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android.app.Activity onCreate, onDestroy, onPause, onStop, onPostResume, onRestart, onResume,onRestoreInstanceState, onPostCreate, onSaveInstanceState, onStart
android.app.Service onBind, onCreate, onStart, onDestroy
android.app.ContentProvider onCreate
android.app.Application onCreate, onTerminate, ActivityLifecycleCallbacks















android.app.Application onConĕgurationChanged, onLowMemory, onTrimMemory
android.location.LocationListener onLocationChanged, onProviderEnabled, onProviderDisabled, onStatusChanged
in drvGen is complete (rule 5.6.1). In each iteration, since generation of event sequences are
complete (rule 5.6.1), all the dynamically-/statically-registered relevant components and events
can be reached (assumption, rule 5.6.2 and 5.4.1).
5.7 Implementation and Evaluation
DPF has been implementedwith approximately 20K lines of Java code, in addition to various
libraries that we employ. Most of our engineering eﬀorts on implementing DPF are spent
on driver generation and mocking up the methods in Android OS. e static app reduction is
implemented based on SAAF [124]. We use apktool [1] to translate the DEX code of apps into
smali format, on which the static slicing is performed. Directly analyzing the bytecode instead of
source code allows us to avoid the imprecision of decompiling apps. e events that are taken into
consideration by driver generation are listed in Table 5.2. emock-up Android OS is developed
based on the Framework of Android 4.0 (API Level: 14). We use dex2jar [7] to translate DEX
code of apps into Java code compatible with JPF.
In the following, we evaluateDPF in terms of its eﬀectiveness and accuracy. In particular,
we investigate the following four research questions.
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 RQ1 Eﬀectiveness: can DPF detect security and privacy property violations in real-
world apps, or prove their absence, and what is its eﬃciency?
 RQ2 Precision, can DPF achieve a more correct and precise analysis than the ad-
vanced static and dynamic analysis tools?
 RQ3 Is static app reduction eﬀective for improving the scalability of state space exploration?
 RQ4Given that DPF has the mock-up OS to enable the execution of Android apps on
JPF's JVM, is it possible to support JPF's diverse set of property checkers for non-security
properties?
Our evaluation subjects include the following three sets. e ĕrst set consistes of four real-
world apps downloaded from Google Play and an alternative market in China, including an
ebook app (denoted by ebook), a scientiĕc calculator app and a location sharing app named
GPS Share [11] which allows users to share locations through SMS. ese apps represent real-
world applications which utilize a broad variety of core functionalities supported by Android,
such as accessing locations, accessing the IMEI and sending SMS messages. We select the ebook
app and the calculator app because we ĕnd that they request privileges that are not necessary
for their functionality; for example, the ebook app requests the permissions of INTERNET and
READ PHONE STATE. We use them to investigate whether DPF can identify malicious be-
haviors abusing these permissions. Our subject set also includes a complicated and realistic open
source app called InsecureBank [173]. It is embedded with harmful API calls and various behav-
iors of leaking information.
e second set consists ofmalware samples. We test four knownmalware samples released by
recent research [220], namely ZitMo, Geinimi, Spitmo and Zsone. ese samples violate the priv-
ilege property by sending premium SMS messages (Geinimi and Zsone) and blocking incoming
SMS messages (ZitMo and Spitmo), and privacy property by stealing the incoming SMS mes-
sages (ZitMo and Spitmo) and IMEI (ZitMo).
e third set of apps is a comprehensive benchmark called DroidBench [44], which has been
created to evaluate information Ęow analysis. It includes 62 open source apps, some of which
lead to violations of privacy properties. It contains a suite of challenges for analysis tools to check
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Table 5.3: Statistics in Our Experiments
LOC: lines of code in smali, including third-party libraries; #Components: number of relevant/overall components; #Events:
number of relevant/overall events; OM: out of memory; AC: app crashed. ose numbers in the brackets stand for the statistics in
the exploration without static reduction.
Subjects Static Reduction Dynamic Exploration
App name LOC #Components #Events Time(S) Exploration Memory #BacktrackedTimes(S) (MBytes) States
Ebook 7.0K 2/2 7/9 10.6 2 (4) 188 (321) 1428 (3900)
Calculator (main Activity) 6.5K 3/4 3/26 3.4 1 (AC) 119 (AC) 8 (AC)
GPSShare 1.2K 1/3 8/17 2.4 3 (172) 366 (409) 2792 (49556)
InsecureBanky 2.3K 4/5 11/12 3.0 183 (184) 596 (596) 132307 (133809)
Youmi (main view) 15.6K 1/1 1/5 10.6 2 (13) 185 (590) 73 (5257)
ZitMo 576 1/3 3/4 2.3 6 (6) 111 (117) 393 (394)
Geinimi 13.0K 4/6 6/21 5.9 OM (OM) OM (OM) 2.5K (OM)
Spitmo 704 1/1 1/1 2.6 4 (4) 78 (78) 66 (66)
Zsonez 29.4K 2/4 3/10 30.5 3 (AC) 61 (AC) 113 (AC)
PrivateDataLeak1 50.8K 1/1 3/3 8.6 2 (2) 78 (78) 38 (38)
Button2 50.7K 1/1 4/4 9.0 2 (2) 78 (78) 41 (41)
AnonymousClass1 50.7 1/1 3/6 8.6 2 (2) 78 (78) 20 (177)
LocationLeak2 50.7K 1/1 3/6 8.7 2 (2) 78 (78) 20 (177)
y When fed with inĕnite event sequence, the exploration of InsecureBank did not terminate. e statistics in this row was obtained
by setting the length of sequence as 16.
z In the experiment of full permutations, Zsone crashed due to a null reference when its onResume() is called.
both false negatives and false positives, such as locations in arrays and lists, callbacks, ĕeld and
object sensitivity, ICC, obfuscation, reĘection and implicit Ęows. is benchmark is challenging
for the state-of-the-art static veriĕers such as FlowDroid [44], which partly motivates this work.
5.7.1 Eﬀectiveness of DroidPF
In our experiments, we check both privilege and privacy properties. For privilege properties, we
focus on the sensitive behaviors that are not initiated by the GUI events (i.e., stealthy behaviors),
such as blocking incoming SMSmessages and sending SMSmessages. For privacy properties, we
check whether the sensitive data, including device ID, location and contacts are leaked through
the network, SMS and logs. Table 5.3 lists the statistics of our experiments (for the sake of brevity,
we omit most statistics of the DroidBench experiments). Our experiments were conducted on a
PC with Intel Core 2 DUOCPU E6550 at 2.33 GHz and 4GB RAM.e veriĕcation results using
DPF (i.e., the counterexamples or the correctness claim) have been conĕrmed by manually
analyzing the smali code.
DPF successfully veriĕes one of the real-world app samples and detects property viola-
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tions or bugs from the remaining three. DPF detects in GPS Share that the location infor-
mation is taken as a parameter to invoke Andoid's SMS activity, we do not regard it as a "sink"
since SMS activity prompts the user and will not send out the SMS messages without the user's
consent. Second, DPF detects that a library in the calculator app connects the server located
at http://58.221.57.115:81 to download app packages. ird, DPF reports leakage of
the device ID in the ebook app, which was previously unknown. Our investigation reveals that
its main components do not leak the device ID. Instead, the leakage occurs in an embedded ad-
vertising SDK named Youmi. Lastly, from the InsecureBank, DPF identiĕes the leakage of
sensitive data (phone number and input data) through the channels of HTTP, system logs and
SD card.
For the malware samples, DPF identiĕes data leakage from three of them. First, from
Zsone, DPF detects a trace which is initiated by the onCreate lifecycle event of its main
activity and leads to the invocation of sendTextMessage, which sends seemingly meaningless
SMS messages (e.g., aAHD) to four numbers (e.g., 10626213). Aer further investigation of the
phone numbers, we ĕnd that those messages are used to register premium services from the
Chinese mobile networks. DPF also identiĕes that one of Spitmo's broadcast receivers (i.e.,
SMSReceiver) blocks incoming SMS messages by invoking abortBroadcast. It also forwards
the messages to a phone number stored in the ĕle asset/settings.xml. In ZitMo, DPF
detects a similar trace. However, DPF does not terminate on Geinimi and we stop the explo-
ration when the machine is out of memory. Aer our manual investigation, we ĕnd that Geinimi
blocks on contacting the C&C server for commands, while the server is no longer active.
To investigate the eﬀectiveness of the static path reduction, we test the main components
of the apps without applying the reduction (i.e., the numbers are in brackets in Table 5.3). As
shown in the table, when we take the full permutations of the events as input to the apps, the time
and space eﬃciencies decrease signiĕcantly. In addition, it the experiment on the calculator app,
DPF detected a soware bug. e app does not validate the input before parsing a value of
type double, which causes the crash of the app when DPF clicks button "=" aer clicking
button ".".
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Table 5.4: Comparison of Results on DroidBench
X= correct alarm, 7= false alarm,#= missed leak
multiple circles in one cell: multiple leaks expected
empty cell: no leaks expected and none reported
App Name FlowDroid TaintDroid DPF






AnonymousClass1 XX XX XX
Button1-3 XXXX XXXX XXXX
LocationLeak1&2 XXXX XXXX XXXX
LocationLeak3 XX XX XX
MethodOverride1 X X X
MultiHandlers1 7
Unregister1 7
Field and Object Sensitivity
FieldSensitivity1&2&4 777
FieldSensitivity3 X X X
InheritedObjects1 X X X
ObjectSensitivity1&2 77
Inter-Component Communication
IntentSink1 # X X
IntentSink2 X X X
ActivityCommunication1 X X X
Lifecycle
BroadcastReceiverLifecycle1 X X X
ActivityLifecycle1-4 XXXX #X#X XXXX
ServiceLifecycle1 X X X
ApplicationLifecycle1-3 XXX XXX XXX
Ordering1 77
General Java
Loop1&2 XX XX XX
SourceCodeSpeciĕc1 X X X
StaticInitialization1 # X X
UnreachableCode
Exceptions1&2&4 XXX XXX XXX
Exceptions3 7
Obfuscation
Obfuscation1 X X X
ReĘection
ReĘection1-4 X### XXXX XXXX
Miscellaneous Android-Speciĕc
PrivateDataLeak1-3 XXX XXX XXX
DirectLeak1 X X X
InactiveActivity
LogNoLeak
Library1&2 X X X
Implicit Flow#### XX## ####ImplicitFlow1-4 #### #### ####
Sum, Precison and Recall
X, higher is better 39 44 44
7, lower is better 9 9 0#, lower is better 13 8 8
Precision p = X/(X+7) 81.3% 83.0% 100%
Recall r = X/(X+#) 75.0% 84.6% 84.6%
F-measure 2pr/(p+ r) 0.78 0.84 0.92
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5.7.2 Precision of DroidPF
We use the DroidBench to evaluate DPF in terms of precision, which is the most critical
criteria for a veriĕcation tool. We compare DPF with state-of-the-art static information-
Ęow analysis tool FlowDroid [44] and dynamic taint analysis tool TaintDroid [95].
Table 5.4 summarizes the test results. Most of the statistics of FlowDroid is collected
from [44]. As DroidBench evolved, 25 new apps were newly added. We run FlowDroid to test
these new apps (results are in red font in the table). Overall, DPF achieves more precise
results than both FlowDroid and TaintDroid. ere are two factors why DPF outperforms
FlowDroid. e ĕrst reason is that some program paths leading to leakage is very hard to iden-
tify statically, for example, data Ęow through HashMaps, lists and arrays. e second reason is
that the dynamic feature of DPF makes it more capable in addressing the Android-speciĕc
event-driven execution feature. In particular, DPF can precisely bind event handlers, track
dynamic (un)registrations and order the occurrence of events. Compared with TaintDroid,
DPF adopts a ĕne-grained taint tracking on composite data types. erefore, it becomes
more precise in detecting taint Ęowing through these data types.
During the exploration of DroidBench, one event sequence causes one of the apps called
FieldAndObjectSensitivity FieldSensitivity1 to crash. Our examination conĕrms that
the crash is resulted by a use-aer-free vulnerability. We have report this vulnerability to the
author of DroidBench, who acknowledged our ĕnding and will rectify it in the upcoming Droid-
Bench 2.0.
5.7.3 Experiments on Non-security Properties
Given that DPF enables the execution of Android apps on JPF, we can compare it to JPF-
Android [201], another tool that veriĕes Android applications using JPF. JPF-Android makes use
of JPF's class modeling and native method modeling features to bound the environment of the
application created by the Android core libraries. To drive the execution of the application, users
script nondeterministic event sequences and can also set the state of the environment. is is
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a more manual approach to limit the number of input events than DroidPF where the tool can
slice away unimportant or uninteresting parts of the application to reduce the number of avail-
able events. JPF-Android supports detection of deadlock, race conditions and runtime errors
using the listeners provided by JPF. It does not, however, target security errors in Android appli-
cation but allows users to specify properties in the form ofChecklists to verify that the application
executes speciĕc event sequences [202].
We apply DPF on two apps tested by JPF-Android in the paper [201], an app contain-
ing deadlock and a calculator app. Since this experiment does not target the detection of security
errors, we directly apply driver generation and explorationwithout static reduction of the applica-
tion code. DPF successfully detects the deadlock which has been reported by JPF-Android.
It also detects an unreported bug in the calculator leading to an app crash. e bug is caused by
an unchecked array index, which occurs when the input box is empty and DPF "presses" the
backspace button. JPF-Android does not detect this bug because the triggering sequence was
not part of the script used to analyze the calculator.
5.7.4 Limitation and Discussion
We acknowledge that verifying Android apps is an extremely challenging task. DPF is only
a step towards that goal and it has its limitations.
Firstly, DPF is based onmodel checking and thus it has the limitation ofmodel checking,
i.e., the app (aer static reduction) must have only ĕnitely-many states and the number of states
is not beyond the capability of current model checking techniques. Since DPF leaves the
task of state exploration and state comparison (to avoid exploring the same state more than once)
to the underlying JPF, DPF can verify an app only if the app, aer reduction performed in
DPF, can be veriĕed by JPF.
Secondly, similar to most information Ęow analysis [191, 95], DPF cannot identify the
implicit leakage through control Ęow dependency; for example, the value of x is leaked implicitly
in this statement: if(x==1) y=1; else y=0;. A straightforward solution is to propagate the
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taint to y, but this may lead to over-tainting and false-propagation problems. For future work,
DPF can employ more advanced solution such as DTA++ [132].
irdly, DPF is perhaps not eﬀective if the app contains behavior which is triggered by
data inputs and which cannot be pruned through static reduction, such as the attack behaviors
enabled on a speciĕc date and our Geinimi case study which launches attacks based on received
commands. In theory, we could always enumerate all possible values for the data input. In prac-
tice, a data input of type string or Ęoat would oen result in state space explosion. For future
work, techniques like symbolic execution [41, 217, 75, 48, 178] can be considered to alleviate this
problem.
Lastly, similar to related work in the literature, DPF cannot handle apps that include
native code (in the app itself not from the Android OS). In this work, we also do not consider
hardware attacks (e.g., cold-boot attack [172]) and side channels (e.g., Soundcomber [188]).
5.8 RelatedWork
Android Application Veriĕcation. DPF is not the ĕrst study on verifying Android apps.
Merwe et al. propose JPF-Android [201, 202] which veriĕes the Android apps also using JPF.
DPF is distinctly diﬀerent from JPF-Android in terms of many aspects. First, JPF-Android
uses simpliĕed model of the Android Framework while DPF mostly reuses the source code
of the Framework to preserve the semantics. Second, JPF-Android requires the analysts to script
the input events while DPF attempts to generated the drivers automatically. ird, JPF-
Android currently checks common properties like deadlock or runtime errors while DPF
incorporates non-trivial security property checking.
Android Application Analysis. ere have been several approaches using program analysis to
analyze the security and privacy properties of Android apps [150, 44, 99, 78, 217, 126]. Flow-
Droid [44] is one of the most advanced approaches, which proposes a taint analysis featuring
in addressing Android's ubiquitous callbacks. Pegasus [78] checks apps for the properties that
can be speciĕed in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Similar to Pegasus, AppIntent [217] aims to
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detect malicious behaviors by identifying whether the suspicious behaviors are initiated by the
user. CHEX [150], SCandroid [99] and IccTA [137] are mainly devoted to inter-component Ęow
analysis. Although program analysis is mature and has been proven powerful in detecting vul-
nerabilities, its precision is limited by point-to analysis [122]. ere are several dynamic analysis
approaches to test the apps, which is either by instrumenting the Android OS [95, 218, 50] or
based on virtualization [213, 161]. TaintDroid [95] and VetDroid [218] dynamically track the
sensitive data Ęow through the OS and apps.
e precision of DPF depends on activating all application behaviors. Its dependency-
constrained event permutation approach aims to cover possible valid event sequences. ere are
a few studies also attempting to solve this challenge. SmartDroid [219] and O [216] com-
bines static and dynamic analysis to trigger UI events. SwiHand [84] uses an abstract-reĕnement
approach to generate sequences of test inputs. AppIntent [217] and [161] use symbolic analysis
to identify inputs to drive the analysis further. Dynodroid [151] uses an observe-select-execute
approach which selects event inputs based on observed states to improve the coverage. A3E [47]
explores app components andmimics user actions based on the strategy learned from the control
Ęow graphs.
5.9 Summary
We present DPF, which provides a framework for verifying Android apps against security
properties based on targeted soware model checking. We havemade eﬀorts to address the main
problems in verifying Android apps, such as multiple entry points/event-driven execution, GUI
testing and path explosion. DPF shows that it is feasible to model check the soware imple-
mented in high-level language like Java and running on a complicatedOS.We hopeDPF can
inspire future research that brings the cutting-edge model checking techniques from the speciĕ-
cations to the implementations.
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Conclusion and Future Work
ework conducted in this thesis has made some scientiĕc-technical contributions. is chapter
brieĘy summarizes these contributions and presents possible future work.
6.1 Summary
is thesis aims to enhance the practical use of formalmethods for analyzing secure systemdesign
and implementation by extending existing formalisms and combining program analysis tech-
niques with formal methods. We have investigated three formal methods, i.e., symbolic model
checking, speciĕcation extraction and soware model checking, and focused on three security-
critical areas, i.e., trusted computing, web authentication and mobile applications. In addition,
we have proposed formalisms and techniques that assist designers, developers and security ana-
lysts on automating the formal analysis of the systems in these areas.
Observing that designing trusted platforms can be error-prone, we appliedmodel checking to
verify the security properties of trusted platforms on the design level. In particular, we proposed
TF, a formal foundation for model checking trusted platforms. It includes an interface
TrCSP# for modeling the trusted platforms, a formal model of the key techniques used in trusted
computing, as well as a broad spectrum of threat models. We implemented it as a framework in
C# and CSP# based on the model checker PAT. Our analysis on a digital envelope protocol and a
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cloud computing platform has detected two previous-unknown security Ęaws, thus demonstrat-
ing the power of model checking in detecting property violations. e digital envelope protocol,
which has been proved correct by a previous work [91], is found by TF to be subject to
a reboot attack. is is because TF embeds more comprehensive attack models. Due
to the expressiveness of TF and its comprehensive attack models, TF can
serve as a formal foundation for research on formal veriĕcation of trusted platforms.
In reality, establishing precise and complete formalmodels (that TF and other sim-
ilar studies require) of many secure systems is impossible due to factors such as lack of documen-
tation and partial availability of implementation. In order to extract analyzable models for the
use of formal methods in the area of web authentication, we proposed AS, an end-to-
end platform to recover authentication protocol speciĕcations from their implementations. We
applied AS to several real-world web sites, including several using important SSO proto-
cols like Facebook Connect Protocol, BrowserID andWindows LiveMessenger Connect, and we
successfully detected 7 security Ęows in their implementations. Our work is signiĕcant because
it demonstrates the advantage and practicality of formal methods in violation detection even un-
der the constraints of imprecise and incomplete models. Consequently, it is worth sacriĕcing
soundness and completeness when formal methods are used for violation detection rather than
for correctness proving.
Both TF and AS analyzed the formal models translated from the checked
systems. However, there still exists gap between these formal models and the implementations
which the security eventually relies on. erefore, our work also made an attempt of applying
the formal methods directly on the system implementations. In particular, we targeted Android
mobile platform, one of the security-critical areas, and presented DPF which is a security
veriĕcation framework for Android apps based on targeted soware model checking. We have
made eﬀorts to address the main problems in verifying Android apps, such as multiple entry
points/event-driven execution, GUI testing and path explosion. We evaluated DPF using
70 apps including both benign and malicious ones, and DPF detected nearly all (except
those with implicit information Ęow) of the known vulnerabilities from the malware samples,
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a previously unknown data leakage vulnerability from a third-party library embedded by benign
apps, and two soware bugs. DPF achieves overwhelming precision and recall rate than
static analysis approaches. is can be attributed to the particular features of our soware model
checking technique, such as the dynamic inherence which enables DPF to precisely detect
property violations that can only be determined at runtime and the event permutation method
which enables DPF to address the Android-speciĕc event-driven execution feature. Our
work on DPF suggests that it is feasible to model check the soware that is implemented in
advanced programming languages like Java and is running on a complicated OS.
6.2 Future Work
As it can be observed, there is yet a wide gap to be ĕlled before formal methods are widely and
extensively used in the real world. is section outlines possible future directions for research
related to this thesis.
As trusted computing techniques are increasingly employed in newly emerging areas (e.g.,
Smart Grid [176, 175] and Web of ings [53]), TF could be used as a foundation to
analyzing the security properties of these platforms. Currently, our work of TFmainly
targets TPM version 1.2, whereas TCG recently released the speciĕcation of TPM 2.0 for public
review. A necessary extension of TF, therefore, is to embed models of TPM 2.0, such
that TPM2.0 based platforms such as theDirect AnonymousAttestation (DAA) protocol [79] can
be supported. In addition, TPM is not the only hardware-based security feature used in trusted
computing. Another possible avenue of future research is to consider other features which are
signiĕcantly diﬀerent from TPM, such as Intel's TXT and ARM TrustZone.
Although AS has been shown to be eﬀective in identifying Ęaws in implementa-
tions of authentication systems, proving their correctness is impossible under the circumstance
of partially-available implementations. Given the wide employment and security sensitivity of




e work of DPF targets the problem of exploring execution paths activated by events.
However, as discussed in Section 5.7.4, in order to completely verify the apps, another critical
problem is to explore the behaviors triggered by data inputs, such as the attack behaviors enabled
on a speciĕc date and ourGeinimi case studywhich launches attacks based on received commands.
As future work, we would introduce some advanced techniques, for example, symbolic execution
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Appendix A
TML to ProVerif Inputs
TML is an high-level abstract model language, which can be directly translated into applied pi-
calculus. We do not present the formal semantics translation between these two languages, but
intuitively explain the mapping between them. e applied pi-calculus model of the running
example (Figure 4.1 and 4.3) is shown in Figure A.1.
Conversion. Most syntax and semantics can be directly mapped to applied pi-calculus. e
initial conditions (initial knowledge of the participants) are represented with a set of global
variables (line 17-21), where the terms initially unknown to Z is labeled as private, such as
k IDP s (line 18), the private key of IDP S. e cryptographic functions are translated into
constructor (fun) and destructor (reduc) (line 6-15). e local protocols are represented with
the processes (line 33-82), whose identifers are represented with i,j,r,p (line 17) of Host
type (line 1). For the action schema, theBegin* and End* are mapped to event (line 67 and 57);
the Send and Receive are mapped to out and in; the assoc is represented with the table (line
22), andNewAssoc is mapped to insert a tuple into the table (line 34). However, one problem
is that ProVerif does not scale as the number of tables increases. To solve this problem, we also
can model the assoc using functions. In particular, AS uses the same modeling method
as modeling symmetric cryptographic primitives. For example, the assoc(i; authtoken) in Fig-
ure 4.3 is modeled as mysenc at line 13-15. Specially, if this assoc happens to be a long-lived or
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guessable token which needs to be added into Z's knowledge set, AS just casts the en-
cryption key to the attacker (addattackerknow at line 77-78). e checking action is mapped
to the matching action, for example, let(=M, =N) = checksign(P, spk(k IDP s)) (line
42) checks whether P is a signature over (M, N) using the private key K IDP s. e chan-
nel is slightly diﬀerent from TML because ProVerif supports both public and private channels.
AS translates HTTP into public channel (ch at line 23, 38 and 46) which is readable
and writable to the attacker; HTTPS and cross-domain communication is translated as private
channels (https at line 25 and 48, and browser at line 24 and 40).
For the syntax or semantics not supported by ProVerif, AS models them in alter-
native ways. For example, ProVerif does not support a writable but non-readable (for the at-
tacker) or a readable but non-writable channel. When AS ĕnds that the sender origin
of postMessage is not checked (such as Step­ in Figure 4.1), whichmeans this channel becomes
an attacker-writable channel (but remains unreadable), it turns the browser channel writable by
adding an input before outmessages to browser, as shown at line 38-40. Conversely, if it ĕnds
that the channel is readable, it adds an out aer in message from the channel. Finally, aer we
ĕxing all the vulnerabilities, ProVerif reports that the protocol is veriĕed.
Detected vulnerabilities. ProVerif detects three attacks in this model. First, it reports that the
attacker can derive the token using the key k i j com cast to his knowledge set (line 77-
78). Aer "ĕxing" this Ęaw (Here ĕxing means correcting the Ęaw in the model instead of in the
implementation) as shown at line 74-78, it reports a replay attackwhere the attacker can obtain the
token from line 46, and then replay it to line 54. Aer "ĕxing" this Ęaw using HTTPS to replace
HTTP as shown at line 48 and 55, ProVerif reports the MITM attack shown in Section 4.2.1. e
attacker replaces mynext at line 38 and ĕnally gets the token from line 63.
1 type Host.
2 type key. (*symentric key*)
3 type spkey.(*public key*)
4 type sskey.(*pivate key*)
5
6 (* Shared key encryption *)
7 fun senc(bitstring, key):bitstring.
8 reduc forall x:bitstring,y:key;sdec(senc(x,y),y)=x.
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9 (* Signatures *)
10 fun spk(sskey):spkey.
11 fun sign(bitstring, sskey):bitstring.
12 reduc forall x:bitstring,y:sskey; checksign(sign(x,y), spk(y)) = x.
13 (*fun*)
14 fun mysenc(Host, key):bitstring.
15 reduc forall x:Host,y:key;mysdec(mysenc(x,y),y) = x.
16
17 free i, j, r, p:Host.
18 free k_IDP_s:sskey [private].
19 free k_i_j_com:key [private].
20 free sp:bitstring.
21 free sessionID, CSRFToken:bitstring[private].
22 table sp_table(Host, bitstring).
23 channel ch.
24 free browser:channel [private].





30 query x:Host, y:Host; inj-event(EndResponse(x)) ==> inj-event(BeginInit(y)).
31 query attacker(mysenc(i, k_i_j_com)).
32
33 let SP_C = (*i*)
34 insert sp_table(j, sp);
35 (*******************************





41 in(mynext,(M:Host,N:bitstring,P:bitstring)); (*Step 4*)
42 let(=M, =N) = checksign(P, spk(k_IDP_s)) in
43 (*******************************
44 2. Fix HTTP replay attack
45 *******************************)
46 (*out(ch, (M,N))*)
47 in(ch, (M:bitstring, N:bitstring));
48 out(https, (M,N))(*step 5*).
49
50 let SP_S = (*j*)
51 (*******************************




56 let (=M) = mysdec(token, k_i_j_com) in
57 event EndResponse(i).
58




63 out(Y, (M,N,P)). (*step 4*)
64
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65 let IDP_S = (*p*)
66 in(https, (X:bitstring, =sessionID, =CSRFToken)); (*step 2*)
67 event BeginInit(j);
68 let(M:Host, Mdomain:bitstring) = X in
69 get sp_table(=M, =Mdomain) in
70 let token = mysenc(i, k_i_j_com) in
71 let idpsign = sign((i, token), k_IDP_s) in
72 out(https, (i, token, idpsign)).(*step 3*)
73
74 (*******************************
75 1. Fix guessable token
76 *******************************)










B.1 Extracting BrowserID Protocol
In this section, we detail the process on analyzing myfavoritebeer.org to demonstrate how
AS extracts model from the implementation. As shown in Figure B.1, the traces cap-
tured by AS are listed in the ĕrst two columns, and the corresponding TML statements
inferred are placed in the third column. From message (2), AS infers the HTTP pa-
rameter csrf as a nonce. AS also associates user name (USER) and password (PWD) to
represent that they should be matching. From message (4), through white box analysis, A-
S infers that spkUser and spkUser 1 are an asymmetric key pair generated by function
generateKeypair(). In message (5), AS ĕgures out that the HTTP parameter cert
is encoded as a JSON Web Token (JWT) with each segment separated with "." and encoded
with Base64 encoding (as described in Section 4.4.2). When applying the signature veriĕcation
algorithm RSA over one of the segment (the brute-force search as discussed in Section 4.4.2),
AS ĕnds that it is a signature by IDP S over four data elements occurring previously:
fUSER; spkUser; p; expiregk 1IDP S . Similarly, in message (6), AS identiĕes that func-
tion sign() is used to generate signature fj; expire1gspkUser 1 and this signature is concate-
nated with IDP's signature (i.e., cert) with function bundle(). Aerwards, this concatenation is
sent by invoking function Window.postMessage().
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B.2. INFERRED PROTOCOLS
# Input TML 
(2) 
HTTP Messages Javascript code snippet Initial Conditions 
r has csrf ˄ p has csrf  
IDP_C( r )  
    NewAssoc({r,p},  assoc (USER, PWD)) 
    Send( p, {assoc(USER, PWD ), csrf }) 
IDP_S( p ) 




















IDP_C ( r ) 
    NewKeyPair( spkUser,  spkUser -1)  
    Send( p, USER, spkUser, csrf ) 
IDP_S( p ) 






IDP_C( r ) 
    Receive( p, X
  
) 
IDP_S( p ) 
    NewNonce( expire ) 






a), b.origin)  
IDP_C( i ) 
NewNonce( expire1 ) 
Send( j, [X, { j, expire1 }                ] )   
SP_C( j ) 





Figure B.1: e HTTP Trace of BrowserID and the Corresponding TML Statements
B.2 Inferred Protocols
Figure B.2 demonstrates the protocols inferred using AS; the inferred models are sim-
pliĕed for readability.
B.3 Precision of Inferred Protocols
We investigate the precision of our inferred protocol, which is possible for two of our case studies,
to available documentation and manually-craed speciĕcations. We ĕnd that our protocols are
fairly precise, subject to our qualitative analysis.
BrowserID Precision. We compare our inferred speciĕcation to the documented description of
the protocol online [3]. Our inferred protocolmatches closely to the description in the documen-
tation. In some cases, it reveals useful information that is unspeciĕed in the documentation. For
instance, the documentation says that, the IDP returns a signed structure containing expiration
time in the Step 5 of Figure B.2-(a)), but documentation does not precisely specify the duration of
the "expiration time". AS ĕnds that the duration is large enough to permit replay attacks
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that are longer than 726 seconds. is intermediate result is useful for further analysis, such as
veriĕcation on time sensitive protocols [92].
We ĕnd the protocol to match the documentation exactly (subject to our manual interpreta-
tion), except for one additional diﬀerence. e document states that the SPs are allowed to send
the signed data to BrowserID for veriĕcation in the speciĕcation rather than local veriĕcation.
Since this message is sent between SP and IDP servers rather than been relayed in the browser, it
is not represented in our inferred speciĕcation.
Facebook Connect Precision. Facebook Connect originates from OAuth 2.0 authorization pro-
tocol [94]. In EbayClassiĕed case, our inferred protocol consists of 11 rounds and 65 parameters
(including cookies and GET/POST parameters), comparing to 7 rounds and 11 parameters in
the speciĕcation. e extra rounds and parameters, which shows our inferred protocol is more
precise, may be vulnerable to the protocol and have been analyzed by AS. Furthermore,
compared to recent work which manually extracts the Facebook Connect protocol, our model
has deĕned more precisely the terms exchanged in the protocol [158]. Our inferred speciĕcation
is also more detailed than the prior work of Hanna et al. [116]. Finally, we ĕnd that our Face-
book Connect model is diﬀerent from the description inWang et al.'s recent work [207]--- this is
because their work considers the Flash implementation whereas we analyze the JavaScript-based
implementation which works in today's web browsers by default.
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SP_S SP_C IDP_S




(7) {USER, Ki, expire, IDP_domain}Ks
-1, {expire1, SP_domain}Ki
-1
(2) {assoc(USER, PWD), csrf} Key(IDP_C, IDP_S)
(4) {USER, Ki, csrf} Key(IDP_C, IDP_S)
(5) {{USER, Ki, expire, IDP_domain}Ks
-1} Key(IDP_C, IDP_S)
(6) {{USER, Ki, expire, IDP_domain}Ks
-1, {expire1, SP_domain}Ki
-1}K_B




(3) {SID, assoc(SID, Domain), assoc(Email, password)}Key(IDP_C, IDP_login)
(4) assoc(SID,Domain), assoc(Email, c_user), xs)
(6) {access_token, signed_request, Domain}Key(IDP_C, IDP_rp)
(8) {access token, signed_request, Domain}Key(IDP_C, IDP_connect)
(5) assoc(SID,Domain), assoc(Email, c_user), xs)
(7) {access_token, signed_request, Domain}Key(IDP_C, IDP_connect)
(9) {access token, signed_request, Domain}K_B
IDP
(b) e Sequence Diagram of Facebook Connect
Figure B.2: e Sequence Diagrams Inferred from Implementations of BrowserID and Facebook
Connect
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